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Crop Biotechnology could help achieve a more food-secure world. However, the 
strong opposition to GM food, particularly in Europe, will undoubtedly affect the 
diffusion of GM crops worldwide, delaying or preventing the world from realizing the 
potential benefits of GM crops in terms of food security. This “braking effect” could 
deprive the world of a potential tool to increase or stabilize the future worldwide 
availability of food under a changing or more volatile climate. It is therefore essential to 
understand how the opposition to GM food has and will affect the diffusion of 
biotechnological innovations worldwide in order to estimate the effect of this opposition 
on global food security.  
The main objective of the thesis is to estimate the loss in global food security if 
the EU does not relax their opposition to GM food.  To meet this objective a market 
model is combined with a GM diffusion model to create a global food security (GFS) 
model. The focus of the model is GM wheat, due to the vital importance of conventional 
wheat to global food security. This approach allows us to evaluate dynamic economic 
responses to food production shocks, such as climate change.  The GFS model is 
calibrated using production, consumption and price data for wheat.  A number of 
scenarios are analyzed to consider the range of potential effects of the EU opposition on 
global food security. The results of the analyses will better inform the ongoing GM 
policy debates, which often ignore food security impacts. 
 iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Richard Gray, for his 
valuable guidance and assistance in all aspects of the research process. 
Thank you to Dr. Peter Phillips, member of my advisory committee, for contributing by 
his time and expertise to the completion of this thesis. 
Thank you to Dr. Ken Belcher, member of my advisory committee, for his helpful 
comments and advice on developing and reporting this research.  
Thank you to Dr. Joel Bruneau, member of my advisory committee, for his valuable 
suggestions, especially in the later stages of this thesis. 
Thank you to Dr. Hartley Furtan for his advice on the modeling component of the thesis 
and for his friendship. 
 I would like to thank my external examiner Dr. Terry Veeman, for the time he dedicated 
to my thesis, for his contributions to the final product and for making my thesis defense 
a challenging experience.  
I also thank the entire faculty, staff (especially Deborah), and students for making the 
Agricultural Economics department an enjoyable place to work.  
I thank my friends and family, for their encouragement over the past years. I would like 
to express my utmost gratitude and appreciation to my girlfriend, Jean, for being patient 
and supportive during the completion of this thesis. 
Finally, I am grateful for the financial support provided by the Department of 
Agricultural Economics, University of Saskatchewan.  





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PERMISSION TO USE......................................................................................................i 
ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................. iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................................................................iv 
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................vi 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... viii 
 
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................1 
1.0 Background...............................................................................................................1 
1.1 Problem statement ....................................................................................................4 
1.2 Objectives .................................................................................................................5 
1.3 Methodology.............................................................................................................6 
 
CHAPTER 2 : FOOD SECURITY, ENVIRONMENT AND AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY .........................................................................................................8 
2.0. Introduction .............................................................................................................8 
2.1. Food security problems ...........................................................................................9 
2.1.1. Global food insecurity problems .......................................................................9 
2.1.2.The concept of food security ............................................................................11 
2.1.3. Wheat and global food security.......................................................................13 
2.2. Environment ..........................................................................................................17 
2.2.1. Climate change influence on food / wheat ......................................................17 
2.2.2. Concerns over future wheat yield variability ..................................................18 
2.3. Technical change ...................................................................................................20 
2.3.1. Past trends in wheat yields ..............................................................................20 
2.3.2. Concerns about future wheat yields ................................................................21 
2.3.3. Agricultural biotechnology: a part of the solution ..........................................24 
2.3.4. GM wheat research..........................................................................................27 
2.4. Adoption of GM crops and consumer opposition .................................................31 
2.4.1. Reasons for consumer opposition ...................................................................32 
2.4.2. EU effect on international perceptions of GM food........................................34 
2.4.3. Effect of opposition on the adoption and diffusion of GM crops ...................36 
2.5. GM wheat and international trade..........................................................................37 
2.5.1. Major exporters ...............................................................................................37 
2.5.2. Trade linkages to potential “rejecters” countries ............................................38 
2.6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................41 
 
CHAPTER 3 :  LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................43 
3.0. Introduction ...........................................................................................................43 
3.1. Food security models.............................................................................................43 
3.2. Effect of Climate Change ......................................................................................45 
3.3. Effect of technical change .....................................................................................45 
3.3.1. Economic effect of GM crops .........................................................................45 
3.3.2. Estimated economic effect of GM wheat ........................................................47 
 v
3.3.2.1. Farm level impacts ....................................................................................47 
3.3.3.2. National and global impacts......................................................................49 
3.4. Diffusion models of agricultural technology.........................................................51 
3.4.1. Consumer opposition in the adoption process.................................................51 
3.4.2. Review of diffusion models ............................................................................51 
3.5. Assessment of the food security literature.............................................................56 
3.6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................61 
 
CHAPTER 4 : MODELING THE EFFECT OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ON FOOD 
SECURITY: THE CASE OF GM WHEAT....................................................................63 
4.0. Introduction ...........................................................................................................63 
4.1. Development of global food security model .........................................................63 
4.2. Adoption model .....................................................................................................66 
4.3.The market and food security elements of the model.............................................75 
4.5. Conclusion .............................................................................................................81 
 
CHAPTER 5 : SCENARIOS ...........................................................................................83 
5.0. Introduction ...........................................................................................................83 
5.1. Scenarios................................................................................................................84 
5.1.1. Local and foreign tolerance indices for the specified opposition scenarios....87 
5.1.2. GM wheat adoption rates under the specified opposition scenarios ...............90 
5.1.3. Food security elements under the specified opposition scenarios...................92 
5.2. Effect of opposition on GM wheat adoption .........................................................97 
5.3. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................103 
 
CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................106 
6.0. Summary of conclusions .....................................................................................106 
6.1. Study limitations..................................................................................................110 




APPENDIX A – WHEAT DATA .................................................................................128 
APPENDIX B – THE CORN DIFFUSION MODEL DATA .......................................131 
APPENDIX C – KEY MARKETS FOR MAJOR WHEAT EXPORTERS .................137 
APPENDIX D – DIFFUSION MODEL RESULTS .....................................................142 
APPENDIX E – FOOD SECURITY MODEL RESULTS ...........................................149 
 vi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1 – Incidence of undernourishment, developing countries ...........................9 
Table 2.2 – Yield variability coefficients, 1961-2002. ............................................18 
Table 2.3 – Annual growth rates and annual average of wheat yield, 1961-2002...22 
Table 2.4 – Decelerating rate of wheat yield growth, 1961-2002............................23 
Table 2.5 – Percentage cultivated area planted to modern varieties of Wheat a in 
developing countries, 1970-1997.............................................................................24 
Table 2.6 – Key exporting countries for wheat (ten year average from 1991-2000, 
thousands of tonnes) ................................................................................................37 
Table 4.1 – Development of GM corn area (million ha) .........................................66 
Table 4.2 – Estimation of the diffusion parameters (case of corn) ..........................73 
Table 4.3 – Area shares of major wheat producers (ten-year average from 1991-
2000) ........................................................................................................................75 
Table 4.4 – Historical wheat yield variability..........................................................79 
Table 4.5 – Calibrated consumption, acreage, and stock parameters ......................81 
Table 5.1 – Opposition scenarios.............................................................................85 
Table 5.2 – Summary of analysis provide by scenario comparisons .......................87 
Table 5.3 – Local and foreign tolerance indices for the specified opposition 
scenarios...................................................................................................................88 
Table 5.4 – GM wheat adoption rates in major exporters, China and the World ....91 
Table 5.5 – Change in availability, expected price, consumption, ending stock, and 
probability of high prices between 2000 and 2030. .................................................94 
Table 5.6 – Effect of opposition to GM wheat on adoption and food security 
elements in 2030 ......................................................................................................99 
Table 5.7 – Effect of opposition to GM wheat on the incidence of 
undernourishment in developing countries in 2030 (demand elasticity =0.25).....103 
Table A.1 – Sources of calories consumed, 1961 and 1997 ..................................128 
Table A.2 – World production, consumption, trade and ending stocks, 1960-2000 
(in million tonnes)..................................................................................................129 
Table A.3 – Wheat yield data in hg/ha ..................................................................130 
Table B.1 – Local tolerance (case of corn) ............................................................131 
Table B.2 – Foreign tolerance (case of corn).........................................................132 
Table B.3 – Pooled data for the diffusion model (case of corn) ............................133 
Table B.4 – Estimation of the diffusion parameters (case of corn) .......................136 
Table C.1 – Key markets for Argentina’s wheat (eleven-year average from 1990-
2000, thousands of tonnes) ....................................................................................137 
Table C.2 – Key markets for Australia’s wheat (eleven-year average from 1990-
2000, thousands of tonnes) ....................................................................................138 
Table C.3 – Key markets for Canada’s wheat (eleven-year average from 1990-
2000, thousands of tonnes) ....................................................................................139 
Table C.4 – Key markets for EU’s wheat (eleven-year average from 1990-2000, 
thousands of tonnes) ..............................................................................................140 
Table C.5 – Key markets for the USA’s wheat (eleven-year average from 1990-
2000, thousands of tonnes) ....................................................................................141 
Table D.1 – Global adoption of GM wheat under different scenarios...................142 
 vii
Table D.2 – GM wheat adoption rates in Argentina from 2000 to 2030 under 
different scenarios ..................................................................................................143 
Table D.3 – GM wheat adoption rates in Australia from 2000 to 2030 under 
different scenarios ..................................................................................................144 
Table D.4 – GM wheat adoption rates in Canada from 2000 to 2030 under different 
scenarios.................................................................................................................145 
Table D.5 – GM wheat adoption rates in China from 2000 to 2030 under different 
scenarios.................................................................................................................146 
Table D.6 – GM wheat adoption rates in the EU from 2000 to 2030 under different 
scenarios.................................................................................................................147 
Table D.7 – GM wheat adoption rates in the USA from 2000 to 2030 under 
different scenarios ..................................................................................................148 
Table E.1 – Real world wheat prices under different opposition scenarios...........149 
Table E.2 – Availability of wheat (million tonnes) under different opposition 
scenarios.................................................................................................................150 
Table E.3 – Consumption of wheat (million tonnes) under different opposition 
scenarios.................................................................................................................151 
Table E.4 – End stock of wheat (million tonnes) under different opposition 
scenarios.................................................................................................................152 
Table E.5 – Probability of high prices ...................................................................153 
Table E.6 – Price variability between 2000 and 2030 ...........................................153 
 viii
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1 – Wheat contribution to total food supply. .....................................................14 
Figure 2.2 – World wheat production, consumption, trade and ending stocks, 1960-2000 
(in million tonnes)............................................................................................................15 
Figure 2.3 – Annual growth rate of wheat yields and harvested area, 1961-2002. 
(Calculated using Data from FAO)..................................................................................16 
Figure 2.4 – Real world wheat prices, 1980-1999. ..........................................................17 
Figure 2.5 – Share of World GM Wheat Field Trials, 1993-2002...................................29 
Figure 2.6 – Number of GM wheat field trials (1993-2002) ...........................................30 
Figure 2.7 – Share of the USA GM wheat field trials by trait, 1994-2002......................31 
Figure 3.1 – Aggregate food situation and food insecurity curves for a given country...57 
Figure 3.2 – Effect of biotechnology on food insecurity in country i..............................58 
Figure 3.3 – Desegregation of demand insecurity ...........................................................61 




CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Background 
After rice, wheat is the most important food staple; it is widely produced, 
consumed and traded worldwide (Antle and Smith, 1999). The rate of growth of wheat 
yields is decelerating at an increasing rate in developing and developed countries alike1. 
This deceleration is occurring despite the continued development of high-yielding 
varieties. This trend reinforces a predominant fear that we may be reaching a yield 
plateau in the case of wheat (Pingali, and Heisey, 2001), and that future global supply 
may be inadequate to meet the future demands of an increasing world population. 
Over the past decades a large body of research has highlighted the severity of the 
food inadequacy for a significant portion of the rapidly expanding global population and 
that future global food demands might outstrip global food production (Kendall and 
Pimentel, 1994; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1990; Brown and Kane, 1994).  Although the world 
has achieved a substantial increase in per capita food supplies globally over the last 
decades, 842 million people, most in developing countries, remain chronically 
undernourished (FAO, 2003). Lack of food security and widespread under-nutrition are 
likely to persist and remain unsolved problems for a significant numbers of people in the 
                                                 
1 This is demonstrated in the next chapter. 
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world in the coming decades (Chrispeels, 2000). It has been estimated that average 
cereal yields must increase by 80% over the 1990 level in order to meet food demands in 
2025 (Serageldin, 1999). 
Ensuring food security for the global population will be more challenging if 
climate change occurs. In the face of climate change food production has to double in 
the next 35 years to meet future needs (Watson, 2001). There is a high degree of 
uncertainty associated with estimating climate change and climate change impacts 
(Parry et al, 1999; Wilson, 2001). Although some researchers predict that the overall 
effect of climate change on food supply will be negligible on a global scale (Adams and 
Hurd, 1999), there will be large regional variations.  Climate change will have adverse 
effects on poor people in the tropics and subtropics, where agriculture is the main 
industry (IPCC, 2001). Those affected people are the already food-poor people. In 
Africa, climate change is expected to depress cereal production by as much as 3% by 
2030, exposing 10 million more people to the risk of hunger (FAO, 2002a). Agricultural 
production will have to adapt quickly to this more volatile climate if a stable food supply 
is to be maintained.  
The combination of agricultural biotechnology2 (GM wheat in this case) and 
conventional plant breeding might lead to very encouraging results in plant improvement 
(Jauhar and Khush, 2001) leading to more abundant food. Agricultural biotechnology 
can be a tool in the fight against hunger under more volatile climate (FAO, 2000), 
because it permits the development of new crop varieties with higher productivity, 
higher nutrition and better adaptation in difficult growing conditions (Pierce, 1999). 
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GM food faces considerable opposition, especially from consumers in Europe 
and Japan. This aversion to GM food is based on concerns over potential health risk, 
environmental effects, ethical concerns, and lack of consumer benefits from first 
generation of GM crops (Noussair et al, 2004). This aversion is magnified by consumer 
mistrust in the ability of government regulatory systems to ensure a safe food supply. In 
response to the opposition to GM food by consumers and lobby groups, the EU has 
enacted legislation that requires labeling for all GM foods leading to trade restriction of 
GM food products.   
The EU intolerance to GM food in general (including GM wheat) is sending a 
signal to other countries (importers as well as exporters) that the debate over GM foods 
is still on and that the market may not yet be ready for new GM products. Consumer and 
environmental concerns in the EU could spill over into developing countries regardless 
of whether they are importers or exporters of agricultural products (Nielsen et al., 2001) 
making them more resistant to the import as well as the adoption of GM crops (Diaz-
Bonilla and Robinson, 2003; Paarlberg, 2001; and Qaim and Virchow, 2000). For 
example, in 2002, Zambia decided to reject food aid of American corn due to concerns 
over the presence of GM seeds, which if planted could ‘contaminate’ their crops and 
jeopardize the country’s exports to countries that accept only GM-free foods 
(Washington Post, 3 August 2002). In the case of GM wheat, several importers have 
already stated that they would not import GM wheat or even conventional wheat from 
the US and Canada if GM wheat is commercialized (Canadian Wheat Board, 2003; and 
US Wheat Associates, 2002).   
                                                                                                                                                
2 In this thesis the term biotechnology is restricted to genetic modification technique (See Persley and Doyle, 2001) for 
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For wheat exporters such as Canada and the USA, the fact that the EU is a wheat 
exporter and does not tolerate GM wheat is a threat to some of their export markets, as 
the EU may be able to guarantee competitively priced GM-free exports. Both Canada 
and the USA have lost a significant share of their export to the EU to their competitors 
due to the introduction of GM traits into some crops other than wheat (Phillips, 2003a). 
The probability of occurrence of this phenomenon in the case of wheat is high, since 
major wheat exporting countries such as Australia have already asserted that they can 
supply GM free wheat for the international markets (GENET-news, 2000). Therefore it 
is highly possible that potential adopters of GM wheat such as USA and Canada will 
hesitate to adopt this technology – at varying degrees– depending on the degree of 
opposition toward GM wheat induced by the EU worldwide. The reduction in the 
adoption of new GM crops such as GM wheat due to this opposition may reduce the 
benefits (in terms of food security) that this technology may offer. 
1.1 Problem statement 
There is an ongoing fear that the world’s food supply cannot meet the demands 
of the growing world population. Many countries and many people continue to see food 
insecurity as a threat to their futures and even the future of humankind.  Countries that 
are heavily dependent on imports, including Japan and Korea, continue to support 
domestic agricultural research and production, based mainly on food security concerns.  
For many less-developed countries, such as India and China, food security continues to 
be an issue of national priority.  For the poorest countries, food security is a very real 
day-to-day problem for many of their citizens (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2001a).  
                                                                                                                                                
more details. 
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GM technology may help the world to reduce food insecurity through increasing 
food availability assuring a greater food supply, food stock, and lower, more stable 
world prices. This technology, however, is under pressure from consumers in developed 
countries (especially in the EU) due to health, environmental and other concerns. This 
opposition toward GM products may spill over into developing countries making them 
more hesitant to import or adopt GM crops. This opposition might further discourage the 
adoption of new GM crops by potential adopters, reducing the benefits (in terms of food 
security) that this technology may offer. However, it is unknown what the impact that 
opposition to GM crops will have on global food security. 
1.2 Objectives  
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of consumer opposition to the 
adoption of GM wheat, with particular focus on European opposition and to the 
realization of its benefits in terms of global food security. A number of scenarios are 
analyzed to consider the range of potential effects for the European opposition on global 
food security. The specific objectives of the thesis are to: 
• Illustrate the gravity of the food security problem globally, examine the role 
of new technology including biotechnology, to help solve this problem and 
explain the relationship between biotechnology and food security; 
• Derive a GM adoption model enabling the estimation of impact of GM 
market acceptance on GM adoption rates 
• Develop a long run stochastic model of the world wheat market. 
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• Develop a global food security model that incorporates the dynamic 
economic responses to opposition to GM food by integrating the adoption 
model and the market model 
• Estimate the impacts of the EU policy on global adoption of GM wheat and 
on global food security under a number of opposition and climate change 
scenarios.  
Achieving these objectives should provide an objective assessment of the 
relationship between the consumer acceptance of biotech and global food security. It 
may also uncover important aspects of the relationship ignored or under-emphasized due 
to the ongoing debate over agricultural biotechnology.  
1.3 Methodology  
First, I identify the scale of the global food security problem and demonstrate the 
role for a technology such as GM wheat to produce higher and more stable yields 
helping to achieve a more food secure world. However consumer opposition might 
affect the adoption and the diffusion of this technology and diffusion of this technology, 
reducing its potential benefits in terms of food security.  Therefore, I developed from the 
literature a GM adoption model based on GM corn that incorporates consumer response 
into the adoption decision of GM product. This adoption model is combined with a 
market model (developed as well from the literature) to compute a global food security 
model that allows dynamic economic responses to opposition to GM food as well as to 
production shocks, such as climate change.  The global food security model is calibrated 
using production, consumption and price data for wheat.   
The model is used to examine global food security in several opposition 
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scenarios under two climate change assumptions. The comparison between scenarios 
leads to estimates of the impacts of the EU policy on food security. In all scenarios, it 
will be assumed that agricultural biotechnology will be able to develop GM wheat with 
new multiple traits (e.g., pest resistance and tolerance to abiotic stresses), which could 
























CHAPTER 2 : FOOD SECURITY, ENVIRONMENT AND AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
2.0. Introduction 
This chapter aims to clarify the connection between food security, the 
environment, technical change (GM crops), and consumer opposition to new technology. 
While global food security may be worsening due to several environmental effects, GM 
crops may have the potential to produce higher and more stable yields achieving a more 
food secure world. However, consumer opposition to GM crops may affect the adoption 
and diffusion of this technology, preventing the harvest of potential benefits in terms of 
food security.  
Wheat is chosen as a case study because it is the second most important food 
staple after rice and is widely produced, consumed and traded worldwide (Antle and 
Smith, 1999). Whatever the result of the debate over GM wheat, it will shape the future 
of GM technology and the future of our food.  
Past trends of wheat yield growth signal the existence of a decelerating effect in 
most regions in the world. Along with the decrease in average wheat yield growth, the 
wheat yields are increasingly variable in many regions. These two factors pose major 
problems for both global and local food security. This raises the fear that future wheat 
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supply will fall short of future wheat demands. By 2020, wheat demand worldwide is 
expected to increase by 40% from its level in 1997 (Rosegrant et al. 1997) and less-
developed countries will double their grain imports, including wheat, by 2020 (Pinstrup-
Andersen et al., 1999b). 
Pinstrup-Andersen and Schioler (2001) argue that conventional technologies 
might contribute about 70% of the technological advances needed to meet the world 
food program targets. Biotechnology offers one way to make up the shortfall. Better 
understanding of the wheat gene map, use of molecular markers to accelerate the 
development of better wheat varieties and transgenic modifications to incorporate new 
traits could help to reverse or slow these worrying trends. However, the opposition 
facing the introduction of GM wheat may affect its worldwide adoption and prevent the 
realization of such benefits.  
2.1. Food security problems 
2.1.1. Global food insecurity problems  
The world has made significant progress over the last decade in decreasing the 
incidence of undernourishment in the developing world, most recently lowering the rate 
to 17% in 1997-1999 from 20% in 1990-1992 (See Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1 – Incidence of undernourishment, developing countries 
Million people % of total population 
1990-92 1997-99 1990-92 1997-99 
Developing Countries 815 776 20% 17% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 168 194 35% 34% 
Near East and North Africa 25 32 8% 9% 
Latin America and Caribbean 59 54 13% 11% 
South Asia 289 303 26% 24% 
East Asia 275 193 16% 11% 
Source: FAO (2002a) 
However, as noted in the latest issue of the State of Food Insecurity in the World 
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(2002a), 840 million people remain chronically undernourished despite the substantial 
increase in per capita food supplies globally. Over 95% of undernourished people are in 
developing countries, while 3.6% are in countries that are in transition, and 1.3% are in 
industrialized countries. 
In 1990-92, as well as in 1997-99, Sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the 
highest incidence of undernourishment. In both periods, over one third of the total 
population of Sub-Saharan Africa was undernourished. South Asia and East Asia also 
have high rates of undernourishment at 26% and 16% respectively. South Asia had the 
highest absolute number of undernourished people (39% of all undernourished people in 
the world), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with 25% (Table 2.1). 
Although most developing countries have achieved a proportional decrease in 
undernourishment since 1990 (see Table 2.1), the absolute number of undernourished 
people continues to rise in some regions because of rapid population growth. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, despite the 1% decrease in the percentage of the 
undernourished population between 1990-92 and 1997-1999, the absolute number of 
undernourished people has jumped by over 15% from 168 million to 194 million. The 
total number of undernourished people in developing countries has decreased by 4.8% 
between 1990-92 and 1997-99 from 815 million to 776 million. This represents a 
decrease by 39 million since 1990-1992 (the benchmark period of the World Food 
Summit in 1996 (FAO, 1996a), corresponding with an average decline of six million per 
year. To achieve the World Food Summit 1996 goal to halve the number of hungry 
people by 2015, the annual rate of decrease of undernourished people should be 24 
million, or over four times the current pace (FAO, 2002b) 
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In 2002, 34 countries needed emergency food aid, compared to 21 countries in 
2001. The most food-insecure countries are on the African continent, (east, south, and 
central) mostly due to bad weather, political conflicts, and the impact of HIV/AIDS. The 
food crises in countries such as Zimbabwe, where half of the population needs 
emergency food aid, pose a special challenge (FAO, 2002c) 
Food assistance is also needed in many Asian regions, such as North Korea and 
Mongolia, often because of floods and droughts. In Afghanistan, a large percentage of 
the population depends on food assistance due to the instability caused by recent wars 
and droughts. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, military operations limit the movements 
of families and cause severe food crises. In Iraq, the recent war has worsened the already 
fragile food security caused by the economic sanctions imposed by the UN (FAO 
2002a). 
In Latin America the food situation is still critical, especially in El Salvador and 
Guatemala. Food insecurity is also affecting several countries from the Former Soviet 
Union (Georgia and Tajikistan), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Chechnya.  
2.1.2.The concept of food security 
Food security has been defined in several ways. The FAO (1985) states that “the 
ultimate objective of food security is to ensure all people, at all times, are in the position 
to produce or procure the basic food they need and that it should be an integral objective 
of economic and social plans”.  
More recently food security has been defined as a state of affairs where all 
people at all times have access to enough safe and nutritious food to maintain a healthy 
and active life (World Bank, 1986; FAO, 1996).  
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The factors that determine the degree of food security in any region or zone are 
food availability, access to food by all people in that region, and nutritional adequacy 
(Lacy and Busch, 1986; FAO, 1998). The ‘availability’ of food is viewed as sufficient 
supply of food with appropriate quality to cover the requirements of a population in both 
the short and the long term.  Availability also implies that the food supply is stable in the 
face of environmental changes and other social or climatic disturbances. Food 
availability is directly dependent on the productivity of grains, roots and the tubers, and 
stability of their yields (Izquierdo, 2000). Food availability depends not only on the 
ability of a country to produce but also on its ability to import food to meet the local 
food demand. 
Food availability is not a sufficient condition for achieving food security (Smith, 
1998). Poverty and food access are recognized as the major causes of people’s food 
insecurity (Maxwell, 1996; Seragildin, 1995; Alexandratos, 1995; Smith et al, 2000). 
The emphasis on access to food is identified with the influential study by Amartya Sen, 
1981 who introduced “entitlements” approach to food security. The dimension of 
‘accessibility’ encompasses the ability of consumers to purchase or obtain the food they 
need.  Accessibility is directly related to the price of food as well as the purchasing 
power of consumers, and can be greatly affected by political and economic stability.  
The third essential element of food security is ‘adequacy’. Adequacy means that 
consumers should have access to a sufficient and sustainable food to maintain a healthy 
and active life, in the short as well as in the long term (D. Maxwell, 1996). 
Poverty, insecurity, instability and distribution are in most cases the main causes 
of food security problems (UK Institute of Food Science & Technology 1999, Lappe et 
al, 1998). Therefore, it is an oversimplification to consider food insecurity as simply a 
 13
lack of food availability. Furthermore, the increase of food availability to meet the food 
requirements of developing countries with surpluses from developed countries could be 
difficult logistically, and may not insure a solution to the food security problems 
(McCalla, 1994).  Most countries are food insecure because they are unable to import 
food due to lack of foreign exchange. To be effective, the increase of food availability 
may need to mainly come from a decrease in the food deficit of the countries themselves 
(Brown, 1995). 
2.1.3. Wheat and global food security 
Wheat is one of the world’s major cereal crops, accounting for over 20% of 
global consumed calories in 1997 (Pardey et al, 2000). The dependence of the world 
population on wheat as a source of calories remains high over time (See Appendix A for 
more details on this topic). People in different regions of the world still depend on wheat 
as one of the most important staple crops.  Since 1961, wheat has remained a major 
source of food supply for an increasing population in both the developing and developed 
world. Wheat still offers over 30% of the quantity of food supplied (in terms of weight) 
for individuals in the developed world, and over 20% of the quantity of food supplied 
















Figure 2.1 – Wheat contribution to total food supply.   
Data from FAO. 
 
Data for world wheat production, consumption, trade and stocks for the period 
1960-2000 are taken from the USDA (details are presented in Appendix A). As shown in 
Figure 2.2, world wheat production has exceeded the world wheat consumption with the 
exception of periods at the beginning of the 1960s, the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. 
Most of the increase in world wheat production between 1960 and 2000 has been the 
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Figure 2.2 – World wheat production, consumption, trade and ending stocks, 1960-2000 (in million 
tonnes).  
 
World wheat trade did not fluctuate much over the period 1960-2000, staying 
approximately at 18% of world production. World wheat stocks, however, fluctuated 
between 1960 and 2000, rising to 35% of world consumption in 2000, reaching levels 
not seen since 1960. World wheat consumption has increased by 1.5 times during 1960-
2000. Wheat production has increased by a similar magnitude between 1960 and 2000 
(Figure 2.2). 
The increase in wheat production occurred despite the downtrend of wheat 
acreage worldwide (Figure 2.3). The downtrend of wheat acres is due mainly to the 
significant decline in wheat acreage in China, the biggest producer in the world. The 
increase in global wheat production between 1960 and 2000 was due to the steady yield 
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growth, which accounted for 86% for the increase in food production in the world 
(Evenson and Gollin, 2003) .The yield  growth is attributed largely to the development 
of high yielding varieties and input intensification (Pingali and Heisey, 2001). However 
the yield growth in many regions of the world is declining at an increasing rate (Figure 
2.3). Another cause of concern is the fact that wheat production leveled off during the 
1990s (Figure 2.2). In fact, since 1997/1998, world wheat production has been 





























































Figure 2.3 – Annual growth rate of wheat yields and harvested area, 1961-2002. (Calculated using 
Data from FAO) 
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As world wheat production, consumption, and trade change, wheat prices have 
varied as well. Real wheat prices are presented in Figure 2.4. The world wheat price is 
estimated by the average of US dollar-denominated free on board (f.o.b) Gulf of Mexico 
export price for US Hard Red Spring No2 (Antle and Smith, 1999). The prices have 
been converted to inflation-adjusted terms using the US GDP price deflator index of 
2000. In real terms, wheat prices have declined by more than 80% between 1980 and 






















Figure 2.4 – Real world wheat prices, 1980-1999.  
2.2. Environment 
2.2.1. Climate change influence on food / wheat 
There is a high degree of uncertainty associated with estimating climate change 
and climate change impacts on food (Parry et al, 1999; Wilson, 2001). Although the 
overall effect of climate change on food supply is expected to be small on a global scale 
(Adams and Hurd, 1999), there will be large regional variations.  Climate change might 
decrease the world food supply, exposing more people to the risk of hunger (Parry et al, 
1999). Climate change will have adverse effects on poor people in the tropics and 
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subtropics, where agriculture is the main industry (IPCC, 2001). Those affected people 
are the already food-poor people. In Africa, climate change is expected to depress cereal 
production by as much as 3% by 2030 exposing 10 million more people to the risk of 
hunger (FAO, 2002b). Agricultural production will have to adapt quickly to this more 
volatile climate if a stable food supply is to be maintained.  
2.2.2. Concerns over future wheat yield variability  
The yield variability for wheat has decreased globally from 1961 to 2002, both 
for developed and developing countries (Table 2.2). Globally the average percent 
deviation has decreased significantly from 4.1% to 2.6%. Although yield variability has 
declined for developing countries between the 1961-74 and 1989-2002 periods, there 
was a significant rise in variability in the 1975-1988 period. This pattern is similar to 
that of Asia developing and Africa developing regions. Both regions have observed a 
significant drop in variability between the later two periods (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 – Yield variability coefficients, 1961-2002. 
 Average percent deviation from trenda Tests of significance between 
periodsb 







1989-2002 F1,2 F1,3 F2,3 
World 4.1% 4.1% 2.6% 1.34 8.54** 6.40** 
Developed Countries 5.6% 5.1% 3.9% 2.22 11.03** 4.96** 
Developing Countries 3.5% 5.0% 2.8% 0.73 4.63** 6.38** 
European Union (15) 5.4% 6.1% 4.0% 0.99 6.89** 6.94** 
Transition Markets 11.7% 11.0% 12.0% 2.72* 3.83* 1.41 
North America  8.7% 6.6% 8.0% 3.60* 2.54 0.70 
Canada 20.8% 14.8% 11.6% 2.40 4.42** 1.84 
U.S.A 6.9% 6.1% 7.7% 1.62 1.79 1.11 
Central America 9.6% 5.6% 6.2% 5.49** 4.19** 0.76 
South America 11.6% 9.8% 6.8% 1.60 1.41 3.48* 
Africa Developed1 16.5% 19.7% 13.7% 0.95 0.54 0.57 
Africa Developing 10.4% 10.5% 8.2% 0.43 1.71 4.01** 
Asia Developed2 22.1% 7.1% 8.1% 2.97* 7.23** 2.43 
Asia Developing 4.2% 5.0% 2.9% 1.08 6.32** 5.86** 
Oceania 17.7% 23.6% 22.0% 0.54 0.65 1.21 
aStandard error from regression: lnYield = a + bt . bSignificance is tested using F-Test Two-Sample for 
Variances. **Significant at 1%. * Significant at 5%. Source: Author’s calculation from FAO data. 
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Other regions, such as Central America, and even North America, have observed 
an increase in yield variability between the 1975-88 and 1989-2002 periods. Although 
this increase was not significant, it is somewhat alarming as North America is among the 
biggest exporters in the world. Many Former Soviet Union states are also traditional 
large wheat producers. A small increase in yield variability in such key regions may lead 
to a significant decline in food availability and a spike in wheat prices, worsening 
already fragile global food security. 
Due to climate change and the possibility of reaching a yield plateau with 
conventional varieties, it is possible that the pattern of increased variability for wheat 
will be more common worldwide and more significant in the future. Climate change 
may already be having an effect. In 2002/2003, Australia and Canada were devastated 
by drought, while East Europe (especially Romania and Hungary) were hard hit by a 
heat wave. Adverse weather also affected USA wheat in 2002/2003. Some researchers 
link these events to climate change. Adverse weather may not only reduce wheat yields 
but also wheat acreage because bad weather could discourage farmers from continuing 
to farm. 
The decrease of global acreage, decelerating yield growth and the potential 
increased yield variance in several wheat producing countries might imply that future 
wheat supplies will be less stable and may not meet the demand of the increasing global 
population. There are several approaches to address decreased food security including 
soil and water conservation practices, modified crop rotations, and agronomic 
innovations such as developing new crops with higher yields.  Pinstrup-Andersen and 
Schioler (2001a) argue that conventional technologies might contribute about 70% of the 
technological advances needed to meet the world food program targets. Biotechnology 
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offers one way to make up the shortfall. Better understanding of the wheat gene map and 
the use of molecular markers to accelerate the development of better wheat varieties 
could help to reverse these trends.  
2.3. Technical change 
2.3.1. Past trends in wheat yields  
Yield per hectare is the most commonly used indicator in measuring cereal crop 
productivity and potential for future growth in developing countries (Pingali and Heisey, 
2001). This section assesses the growth and variability of wheat yields at the global 
level, since in addition to the reason mentioned above, yield is a major explanatory 
factor for production variability and directly reflects the effect of climate and 
technological changes (Naylor et al, 1997).3 Acreage increase, yield gains, multiple 
cropping, and substituting lower yielding crops with higher yielding crops are the four 
main avenues to increase crop production (Evan, 1993). 
Time series data (1961-002) of wheat yield for the world and different region 
were taken from the FAO. The period 1961-2002 is divided into three equal periods, 
period 1─ 1961-1974, period 2 ─ 1975-1988, period 3 ─ 1989-2002. In each period the 
natural logarithm of yield for each region is regressed against time. The slope coefficient 
b is the annual yield growth. As revealed in Table 2.3, almost all regions have 
experienced a significant increase in wheat yield. The global yield almost doubled 
between period 1 and 2. Global yields rose annually by around 2.3% between 1961 and 
2002. In the first period, the yield growth rate in developing countries was slightly 
                                                 
3 To understand the relation between grain yield instability and production  variability see: Hazell 1985,  
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smaller than that of developed countries. However, yield growth of developing countries 
was 2.25 times that of developed countries in the final period. 
2.3.2. Concerns about future wheat yields 
Global wheat yield growth is decreasing at an increasing rate, including 
developing and developed countries, as well most geographical regions (Table 2.4). 
Worldwide, yield growth has decreased by 15% between periods 1 and 2, while it has 
decreased by 64% between the second and third periods (see Table 2.4). The same trend 
is observed for the EU, Transition Markets, and developing Asia. Central America, 
North America, Canada and developed Africa (e.g. South Africa) experienced an 
increase in yield growth rate between period 2 and period 3. The rest of the regions 
(including developing Africa) experienced an obvious decrease in yield growth between 
period 2 and period 3. The yield growth deceleration in developing Africa is due to the 
limited use of modern inputs and diminishing return due to continuous cropping (World 
Bank, 1992). 
                                                                                                                                                
1989, Singh and Byerlee 1990; and Anderson et al. 1988. 
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Table 2.3 – Annual growth rates and annual average of wheat yield, 1961-2002 
 Periods Periods 
  1 2 3  1 2 3 
Regions 1961-2002 1961-1974 1975-1988 1989-2002 1961-2002 1961-1974 1975-1988 1989-2002 
 Annual average yields(hg/kg) Annual growth rate of yields 
World 19,956 13,945 19,980 25,943 2.26** 3.29** 2.81** 1.01** 
Developed Countries 21,298 15,980 21,403 26,509 1.87** 3.49** 2.21** 0.66* 
Developing Countries 17,960 10,616 17,990 25,272 3.11** 3.40** 3.95** 1.49** 
 European Union (15) 40,428 26,184 40,351 54,750 2.69** 3.64** 3.60** 1.15** 
 Transition Markets 17,169 13,324 17,670 20,514 1.67** 4.66** 2.07* -0.15 
 North America  21,340 17,863 21,662 24,494 1.16** 2.41** 0.67 0.7 
  Canada 18,682 15,578 18,585 21,884 1.19** 2.89* -1.18 -0.01 
  U.S.A 22,629 18,932 23,178 25,776 1.16** 2.17** 1.59** 0.96 
 Central America 35,818 25,590 38,685 43,180 2.00** 4.38** 1.65** 1.93** 
 South America 16,376 12,762 15,329 21,036 1.78** -0.11 3.54** 1.62** 
 Africa Developed1 12,760 7,120 11,718 19,442 3.64** 3.87** 3.23* 6.66** 
 Africa Developing 13,094 9,238 12,171 17,872 2.30** 1.21 3.31** 0.81 
 Asia Developed2 27,466 23,659 28,130 30,609 0.98** 1.13 2.53** -0.51 
 Asia Developing 18,340 10,317 18,530 26,174 3.36** 4.21** 4.00** 1.59** 
 Oceania 14,437 12,330 13,756 17,224 1.08** -0.19 1.18 -0.05 
1 South Africa, 2 Japan and Israel. ** Significant at 1%, * Significant at 5%. 
Source: Authors’ calculation from FAO data. 
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Table 2.4 – Decelerating rate of wheat yield growth, 1961-2002. 
 Coefficients of the regressions 
Regions 
 
a b c 
World 9.2752** 0.0366** -0.0007**
Developed Countries 9.4257** 0.0338** -0.0007**
Developing Countries 8.9336** 0.0481** -0.0008**
European Union (15) 9.8590** 0.0430** -0.0007**
Transition Markets 9.1811** 0.0417** -0.0012**
North America Developed 9.6181** 0.0237** -0.0006**
Canada 9.4482** 0.0267** -0.0007* 
United States of America 9.6844** 0.0226** -0.0005**
Central America 9.8263** 0.0468** -0.0012**
South America 9.3997** 0.0030 0.0007** 
Developed Africa  8.6417** 0.0251** 0.0005 
Developing Africa  8.9855** 0.0169** 0.0003 
Developed Asia  9.9142** 0.0207** -0.0005 
Developing Asia  8.8461** 0.0566** -0.0011**
Oceania 9.3724** 0.0033 0.0003 
** Significant at 1%, * Significant at 10%. The coefficients (a, b, and c) are taken directly from regression 
Ln(yield)= a +b t+ c(1/2 t2) for each region.  Source: Authors’ calculation from FAO data. 
 
  
 The coefficient c is a measure of the speed of change in yield growth with time. 
If this coefficient is positive, there is an acceleration effect meaning that yield growth is 
increasing with time. However, if this coefficient is negative, there is a deceleration 
effect meaning that yield growth is declining with time. Many attribute he significant 
decline of yield growth (the coefficient c) to resource degradation due to intensive 
cropping systems (Cassman et al., 1995; and Huang et al., 1995) 
In developing countries, the percentage of the area planted with modern high 
yielding wheat varieties increased significantly, reaching 82% (of the area planted to 
wheat) in 1997 (see table 2.5). In the 1990s, the adoption rates of these modern varieties 
were highest in Latin America and Asia (more than 80%) and lowest in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (around 40%) (Evenson and Gollin, 2003). These modern varieties have played a 
major role in increasing wheat productivity. However, the decelerating effect of the 
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yield growth has happened despite the high adoption rates and continued development of 
newer generations of high-yielding varieties (Sayre 1996).  
Table 2.5 – Percentage cultivated area planted to modern varieties of Wheat a in developing 
countries, 1970-1997 
 
1970 1977 1983 1990 1994 1997 
All developing countries 
20b 41 b 59 b 70 78 82 
Source: Byerlee and Moya (1993); CIMMYT (1996); CIMMYT wheat impacts database. 
a Excludes tall varieties released since 1965. If these varieties are included, the area under modern 
varieties increases. b Excludes China. 
 
2.3.3. Agricultural biotechnology: a part of the solution 
Biotechnology is “any technique that uses living organisms, or substances from 
those organisms, to make or modify a product, to improve plants or animals, or to 
develop microorganisms for specific uses” (OTA, 1989). Agricultural biotechnology 
uses a wide range of processes such as genetic manipulation technology and 
recombinant DNA technology to exploit the biological potential of plants. 
Biotechnology facilitates the development of desired characteristics that are otherwise 
difficult or impossible to achieve through traditional plant breeding techniques. This is 
achieved by implanting foreign gene segments into the genetic structure of an organism 
or by modifying its existing genetic sequence in order to manipulate target 
characteristics (Persley, 1992; Roller and Harlander, 1998). In this thesis, the focus is on 
the use of modern biotechnology (specifically genetic engineering) in crop breeding.4  
While genetic engineering may play a major role in solving the global food 
security problem, this technique has attracted a great deal of concern and criticism. This 
                                                 
4 See Wolpers (1996) for more details about this technique. 
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section outlines concerns and risks that GM food may cause, and the potential it may 
offer to food-insecure people. Developing countries are desperate for whatever tools are 
available in the pursuit of food security. Consumers in developing countries have an 
urgent need for more food, and the priority for many is on how to obtain more food for 
these numerous hungry and food-deficient people.  
There is general agreement that agricultural research and development has 
contributed very substantially to past agricultural productivity and have improved global 
food security (Alston, 2000). However, whether or not biotechnology will be allowed to 
play a role in achieving a food-secure world is still debatable. Pro-biotechnology groups 
often claim that GM crops have the potential to feed the poor, protect the environment, 
and reduce poverty in developing countries. Agricultural technology (biotechnology 
specifically) may affect global food security through several mechanisms. The four most 
important mechanisms are: 
a) Increasing the availability of food through higher productivity and total food 
production. 
b) Improving the access to food through more affordable food, which would 
help to increase and possibly stabilize food consumption. 
c) Stabilizing food supply by helping crops adapt to exogenous shocks such as 
weather variability and possible climate change. 
d) Developing food that is more nutritious.5 
Agricultural biotechnology has enormous potential human and environmental 
benefits. The application of biotechnology could develop crops with improved resistance 
                                                 
5 See Pinstrup-Andersen-Andersen (1984),; Pinstup-Andersen et al  (1976) and Perrin and Scobie (1981) for example. 
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to insect and plant pathogen attacks, and crops with higher yields (Kendall and Pimentel 
1994). This could improve agricultural performance (yields) with reduced use of 
pesticides, which would otherwise have a harmful impact on the environment and 
human health (Huang et al 2001). Along with permitting higher yields biotechnology 
might reduce farming costs as well (Traxler et al. 2003; and Ismael et al. 2001). 
Biotechnology may also offer farmers a greater ability to grow crops in inhospitable 
environments through increased ability of the plants to grow in conditions of drought, 
salinity and extremes of temperature and in the face of other consequences of global 
warming (Genome Prairie 2001). This can help food production to keep pace with the 
needs of growing populations, especially in developing countries. Biotechnology could 
also enhance taste and nutritional levels of staple crops, such as rice, which could then 
help combat widespread nutritional problems among the poor in developing countries 
(Pinstrup-Andersen et al, 1999b; CBAC 2001).  
The above claims about the potential effects of agricultural biotechnology on 
food security in developing countries are viewed skeptically by many. The previously 
stated claims can be seen as extremely biased for several reasons. For example, 
developed countries remain dominant in the innovation and the use of biotechnology, as 
well as the opposition to GM food (see James, 2003). Agricultural biotechnology efforts 
and applications have been mostly limited to solving problems facing farmers in 
developed countries (Pinstrup-Andersen et al, 1999b; Herdt, 1999). It is therefore most 
likely that the benefits of biotechnology will work to the advantage of the countries 
conducting the research rather than to poor countries, since the research will focus on 
improving crops of importance to those countries rather than to developing countries.   
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Technological effects as well as technology transfer are very slow processes, 
while food security is an urgent problem. At the present time most biotechnology 
innovations are profit-driven rather than need-driven (Altieri and Rosset, 1999, Phillips 
and Khachatourians, 2002), which could limit the benefit to poor countries from 
agricultural biotechnology research. It is also doubtful that significant discoveries made 
by private biotechnology companies will be made available quickly and inexpensively to 
poor countries (Byerlee and Fischer, 2000). 
 Despite the debate presented above it is possible under a favorable environment 
for agricultural research and adoption of its innovations (e.g. stable and good 
governance, availability of proper institutions and investment in infrastructure, research 
and rural infrastructure), that agricultural biotechnology may contribute to the 
improvement of global food security. This will happen if biotechnology focuses on 
solving the problems of small farmers and is committed to developing seeds that are 
affordable to farmers in developing countries (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2001b). Success 
ultimately could lead to both higher incomes for small farmers and lower food prices for 
poor consumers.  
2.3.4. GM wheat research 
Monsanto is a key company working on herbicide tolerant wheat and has 
undertaken more than 76% of total wheat field trials in the USA. Monsanto Company 
has conducted several research and development trials with GM wheat in selected 
Canadian Prairie Provinces and in several states since 1994. Until May 2004, Canada 
and the US were considering the approval of a Roundup Ready GM wheat variety; on 
May 10 Monsanto announced it was not proceeding with its new product.  Monsanto’s 
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GM wheat is produced through the insertion of a Roundup resistant gene (a gene from a 
soil micro-organism) into a hard red spring variety. This transformation makes wheat 
tolerant to glyphosate herbicide (Roundup). This wheat was expected to be available to 
farmers as early as 2005, but is now indefinitely postponed.  
Herbicide tolerant wheat is attracting a lot of debate because it is undergoing 
review in the approval process in both Canada and USA. It is likely that other traits will 
have similar attention once they are close to the release stage. Syngenta Company in 
2002 indicated that a fungal  resistance variety may be released around 2007. 
Global GM wheat research started around 1993 and its trends have been closely 
related to the degree of acceptance to the GM food technology. For the purpose of 
understanding this relationship, GM wheat field trial data was collected from several 
web sites.6 Almost all field trials have been undertaken in wheat exporting countries. 
Canada and the USA dominate the GM trait research by being the location of over 45% 
of research in GM wheat traits each (Figure 2.5). 
                                                 
6 Argentine data: http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/0-/index/programas/conabia/index_conabia.htm. 
  Australia data: http://www.health.gov.au/ogtr/index.htm, and www.oecd.org/ehs/biobin. 
  EU data: http://biotech.jrc.it/deliberate/gmo.asp;  
  USA data: http://www.isb.vt.edu/cfdocs/fieldtests1.cfm 













Figure 2.5 – Share of World GM Wheat Field Trials, 1993-2002   
Source: please see footnote 6. 
The number of GM wheat field trials in the world quadrupled from 1998 to 1999. 
This enormous increase is due to the significant increase of wheat field trials in North 
America, and especially Canada. In Canada wheat field trials increased over 9 times 
between 1998 and 1999, while in the USA the number doubled (see Figure 2.6). After 
1999 the number of field trials decreased steadily to reach a level of around 100 in 2002. 
This decline may be related to the ban on approvals of genetically modified foods and 
crops by the EU since October 1998. However, it may simply be because the discovery 
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Figure 2.6 – Number of GM wheat field trials (1993-2002) 
Source: please see footnote 6. 
Herbicide tolerance (glyphosate tolerance) is not the only trait developed in the 
1994-2002 period in the USA, this trait occupied over 65% of field trials. The herbicide 
tolerance trait is followed by fusarium (fungus which causes loss in crop yields and 
grain quality) resistance, virus resistance, agronomic prototype, product quality 
(improved digestibility, increased yield, storage protein altered), marker genes and 






















Figure 2.7 – Share of the USA GM wheat field trials by trait, 1994-2002 
Source: please see footnote 6. 
 
2.4. Adoption of GM crops and consumer opposition 
The global adoption of GM crops has grown dramatically since 1996. In 2003, 
the global area of GM crops was 67.7 million hectares, a 40 fold increase in the global 
area of GM crops since 1996. In 2003, 7 million farmers in 18 countries grew GM crops. 
The number of acres planted with GM crops increased 11% between 1999 and 2000 and 
15% between 2002 and 2003 (James, 2003).  In 2003, the adoption of biotechnology 
remains geographically concentrated, with 94% of the global transgenic crop produced 
by four principal countries. The USA grew 63% of the global total, followed by 
Argentina (21%), Canada (6%) and China (4%). Globally, GM soybean occupies 61% of 
the total GM area, followed by GM corn at 23% (James, 2003). 
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The development and proliferation of GM crops was faced by some skepticism. 
Several studies indicate that the adoption of present GM crops has only modest benefits 
for farmers. A study done by the OECD (2001) indicates that gains from GM adoption 
in terms of yield increase are small. Furthermore, Malla, Gray, and Phillips (2004) 
concluded that marginal returns to research in biotechnology are relatively small due to 
large gestation periods and short periods of adoption. Moreover, consumer perceptions 
about acceptability of GM food has led to lower demand in some regions, particularly 
the EU (Evenson, Santaniello, and Zilberman, 2002; Gaskel, Bauer, and Durant, 1998; 
Kalaitzandonakes, 2000). This opposition to GM penetration in some markets along with 
expected small gains might have slowed the diffusion of GM crops in GM producer 
countries as well as in consuming countries. 
2.4.1. Reasons for consumer opposition 
GM crops developed so far, known as first generation traits, are perceived to 
have no benefit to the end-consumer. This negative perception is one of the major 
reasons for the strong opposition to GM food available to date (Moschini, Lapan and 
Sobelevsky 2000, Phillips 2003b, Gray et al 2001a).  In addition, GM food has 
precipitated health concerns, generated debate about possible environmental damages 
that could threaten the sustainability of agriculture (CBAC 2001, Gray et al 2001a) and 
brought forward significant ethical unease (Thompson 2000). There is also concern that 
biotechnology could reduce agricultural diversity by promoting extensive mono-culture, 
which could make our food supply even more vulnerable to climate change (Altieri 
1995). 
The nature of regulatory oversight for GM wheat may be another reason for 
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consumer rejection of new products. Foreign consumers do not appear to trust the 
regulatory systems in governments such as the USA and Canada, since those 
governments are perceived to be promoters of biotechnology and partners with biotech 
companies.  
Another major reason for consumers to oppose GM food is the widespread 
perception that a few large corporations will be the primary beneficiaries of agricultural 
biotechnology (Phillips, 2003b and Gray et al, 2001a), and that those biotech companies 
have a supply-push strategy for the introduction or commercialization of their products. 
For example, biotechnology companies such as Monsanto have insisted on the 
continuation of the licensing process of GM wheat despite widespread concerns of 
consumers and farmers about the impacts of GM wheat. This accentuates the suspicion 
that the priority of biotechnology companies is commercial interests, regardless of 
farmers’ opinions or interests, and that they will try to force GM wheat on the market.  
Regardless of whether those concerns have a scientific base or not, they pose a 
serious obstacle to the introduction, commercialization, and diffusion of the new GM 
wheat technology. Consumers have the power to influence the decision of governments 
to import GM wheat or not. If a government does ignore the opposition of their 
consumers to GM wheat and approves import, consumers may simply use their 
purchasing power to express their rejection. 
It is important to mention that the weights given to the different concerns as well 
as benefits associated with GM food depends on the level of wealth of those doing the 
weighting (NFSD, 2001). In other words, what an individual thinks about biotechnology 
is quite personal and depends on whether the individual needs this tool (biotechnology) 
or not. For people in developed countries, biotechnology may be a luxury, but for people 
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in poor countries biotechnology may be an important component of a food security 
strategy. 
2.4.2. EU effect on international perceptions of GM food 
GM food faces considerable opposition, especially from consumers in Europe 
and Japan. This aversion to GM food is based on concerns over potential health risks, 
environmental effects, ethical concerns, and lack of consumer benefits from first 
generation of GM crops (Noussair et al, 2004). This aversion is magnified by the 
consumer mistrust in the ability of government regulatory system to ensure a safe food 
supply. In response to the opposition to GM food by consumers and lobby groups, the 
EU has enacted legislation that requires labeling for all GM foods leading to trade 
restriction of GM- food products.  
The EU intolerance to GM food in general is sending a signal to import and 
export countries that the debate over GM foods is still on and that the market may not 
yet be ready for new GM products such as GM wheat. Consumer and environmental 
concerns in the EU could spill over into developing countries regardless of whether they 
are importers or exporters of agricultural products (Nielsen et al., 2001) making them 
more resistant to the import as well as the adoption of GM crops (Diaz-Bonilla and 
Robinson, 2003; Paarlberg, 2001; and Qaim and Virchow, 2000). The EU's opposition to 
GM products may affect many countries stance regarding GM food through several 
mechanisms. The EU may demand food exporters to the EU to label their products or 
otherwise they may stop imports.  This connection between the requirement of labeling 
and the continuation of exports to the EU has already affected Pakistan. There are 
reports that the EU threatened to stop importing agriculture products from Pakistan and 
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other countries if these countries don’t implement labeling rules on feed and food 
exported to the EU (Daily Times, August 25, 2003).   
Most developing countries have no technological ability to distinguish between 
GM-free and GM-based food. Under this condition many countries may be particularly 
cautious about importing or adopting any GM food, because they cannot deal with a dual 
system and cannot prove that their food is GM free once the system is ‘contaminated’ 
with GM food. Several countries may break from adopting or importing GM food due to 
fear that this may contaminate their production system and may jeopardize some of their 
exports to the EU.  The EU has already warned Thai rice exporters that the EU may 
reject Thai rice if any GM organisms are found in it (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1999a). 
The opposition to GM food has spread to some unlikely consumers. In summer 
2002, Zambia and Zimbabwe rejected food aid despite the widespread famine in those 
countries. The Zambian decision to reject food aid for three million people was based on 
concerns over human health and the economic implications of GM food (BBC News, 17 
August 2002). The Zimbabwe government has also rejected food aid of American corn 
due to concerns over the presence of GM seeds, which if planted could ‘contaminate’ 
their crops and jeopardize the country’s exports to countries that accept only GM-free 
foods (Washington Post, 3 August 2002). In another example from Africa, Uganda 
refused to grow a disease-resistant type of banana, fearing it would cost them exports to 
Europe (Angelo, 2003). India also rejected a large shipment of corn-soya blended food-
aid from the US in January 2003 because it contained genetically modified food (Luce, 
2003). 
Furthermore, most developing countries do not have the ability to test for 
themselves whether GM food is safe or not, therefore they will have to defer to others. It 
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is likely that many countries will follow the EU lead, rather than accept the US 
judgment, given that the US is perceived as gaining a direct advantage from promoting 
GM food. The EU stance vis-à-vis GM wheat will be taken as a message that GM food 
is not safe, which might lead many importing countries to import more expensive GM 
free foods to avoid the perceived risk of GM food. 
2.4.3. Effect of opposition on the adoption and diffusion of GM crops 
Many food-exporting countries are conscious and hesitant to adopt GM crops 
due to the experience of North American farmers losing some EU markets because of 
the adoption of GM crops. Following the introduction of GM soy, corn and canola in 
North America, these product exports have faced resistance, especially in the EU. This 
appears to be seriously altering the trade of these three crops7. Market resistance to GM 
food caused key GM adopters such as Canada and the USA to abandon or divert their 
exports to new markets (Phillips, 2003a) causing the two countries a great deal of 
economic losses. The U.S has lost 70% of exports of corn to the EU, and 48% of its 
exports of soybeans to the EU. In Canada the introduction of GM canola had cost the 
country 96% of its canola export to the EU. At the same time the EU has developed new 
GM-free markets, such as Brazil for soybeans and Australia for canola (Phillips, 2003a). 
A GM Herbicide Tolerant flax variety developed in early 1990s was the first GM 
flax crop to receive regulatory approval in Canada (McHughen 2000), but industry fears 
of losing the EU market, which represented 90% of the export market, caused the GM 
flax to never be commercialized. 
                                                 




The discovery of StarLink8 in 2001 in U.S. corn has led to a significant decline in 
Japan's corn imports from the United States. Meanwhile a dramatic increase in imports 
from China and South Africa took place. The StarLink case also caused a movement to 
zero tolerance against the imports of unapproved GM products in Japan. The StarLink 
incident helped strengthen the opposition of Japanese consumers to future imports of 
GM wheat (GENET-news, 2001). 
2.5. GM wheat and international trade 
2.5.1. Major exporters 
Relatively few nations account for most of the wheat exports. Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, the EU, and the USA are the five key wheat exporters in the world. 
These countries account for 37.6% of total production and 85% of trade (see Table 2.6). 
As shown in Table 2.6, Australia, Canada and Argentina have a small share of global 
wheat production, but their low local consumption permits them to be large net 
exporters. EU and USA are net exporters despite large local consumption because they 
have a significant share of global production.  
Table 2.6 – Key exporting countries for wheat (ten year average from 1991-2000, thousands of 
tonnes) 
Key Exporting  Ten Year Share from Ten Year Share from 
Countries Average Production  Total Production Average Export  Total Export 
Argentina 12,610 2.2% 7095.24 7.3% 
Australia 17,922 3.1% 12874.8 13.2% 
Canada 26,861 4.7% 15427.13 15.8% 
USA 63,099 11.0% 31259.1 32.0% 
EU 94,047 16.5% 16532.3 16.9% 
World 571,050 100.0% 97818.4 100.0% 
Source: (FAO, Canada Grains Council, 2002; and Author's calculations) 
                                                 
8 StarLink is a genetically altered corn variety, which had not been approved for human consumption. 
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Many large wheat producers are not net exporters. This is because the largest 
producers, such as China, India and the Former Soviet Union, are also the largest 
consumers. For example, China is the largest producer as well as the largest consumer of 
wheat (1999-2001). Whether or not future wheat production in China exceeds Chinese 
wheat consumption will have a major effect on world markets and wheat prices, 
affecting the state of global food security. 
2.5.2. Trade linkages to potential “rejecters” countries 
While GM wheat was engaged in the approval process (before May 2004), 
several importers had already expressed to the USA and Canada their refusal to import 
GM wheat or even conventional wheat if GM wheat is commercialized. The Canadian 
Wheat Board, which represents 85,000 western Canadian farmers, reports that 82% of its 
customers have indicated that they will reject the import of Canadian wheat once GM 
wheat is introduced (Canadian Wheat Board, 2003). The US Wheat Associates 
conducted a survey of buyers to determine the willingness of buyers to accept GM wheat 
and they received a similar response (Gillam, 2002). Their Asian wheat market survey 
indicates that all of the Japanese, Chinese and Korean, 82% of Taiwanese and 78% of 
the South Asian buyers had indicated they will reject GM wheat. Japanese buyers state 
they have zero tolerance to trace contamination, regardless of Japanese government 
regulation, while a third and quarter of Chinese and Korean buyers respectively have 
expressed limited tolerance to trace contamination. More than 31% of all respondents 
cited consumer rejection to biotechnology as the reason for their opinion, while 30% of 
the respondents indicated food safety issues as the reason of their stance regarding GM 
wheat (Forsythe, 2002). However, some developing Asian markets such as Indonesia 
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indicated they would accept GM wheat, since they expect it to be cheaper than the 
conventional varieties (Cropchoice, June 17, 2003). 
The opposition of foreign consumers to GM wheat ought to be taken as a very 
serious issue for several reasons. First, there are several exporters that may offer GM-
free wheat, which gives no incentive for importers to buy wheat from GM wheat 
producing countries because their wheat exports may be contaminated. Second, the 
intolerance to GM food remains high in the EU.  
The Eurobarometer survey by the European Commission in 2003 found that 
more than 68% of consumers in countries that joined the EU in 2004 reject GM food, 
with more than half believing the GM food to be dangerous (The Economist, 2003). 
The Eurobarometer (1998) opinion poll published by the European Commission 
in December 2001 showed that 94.6 per cent of European citizens want the right to 
choose and 70.9 per cent simply do not want GM food.  Third, wheat is intended mostly 
for human consumption and it is unlikely that GM wheat products will escape the 
labeling rules (highly processed GM products from soy, canola and corn often are 
exempted from labeling because their novel proteins are removed during processing). 
Several EU countries allowed the commercialization and importation of GM 
crops in the 1990s. However, the attitude of those governments has shifted due to 
growing consumer concerns over GM food. The consumer pressure has led to a 6 year 
moratorium on approval of any new GM foods. At the end of 2004, the EU may lift this 
moratorium. However, in exchange, the European Parliament has approved tough 
traceability and labeling rules. The new rules require traceability of genetically modified 
organisms at all stage of production, and the labeling of food exceeding 0.9 percent GM 
content as: "This product is produced from genetically modified organisms". 
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Once a GM crop is released, GM presence throughout the commercial grain 
handling system in the USA and Canada may make low levels of purity (below 2%) 
difficult or impossible to guarantee under any segregation system (Downey and Beckie, 
2002). Due to the fear of potential economic losses due to the increased consumer 
opposition to GM wheat, many wheat producers, farmer organizations, agricultural 
academics, and other groups are expressing their concerns and opposition to the release 
of GM wheat. 
Wheat farmers in countries considering the approval of GM wheat are nervous 
about losing their export market, possibly indefinitely. In May 2003, the Canadian 
Wheat Board asked Monsanto to withdraw its application to the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency (CFIA) for environmental safety assessment of Roundup Ready 
wheat in order to avoid the economic harm that the release of Roundup Ready wheat 
may cause to the Canadian wheat industry. Monsanto initially refused to comply, 
insisting that farmers will benefit from GM wheat and that market acceptance will be 
addressed before the commercialization of Roundup Ready wheat (Network of 
Concerned Farmers, 2003), However Monsanto Ltd announced that it would cease to 
develop and commercialize its Roundup Ready variety of GM wheat on May 10, 2004. 
The Australian Wheat exporter AWB has also expressed awareness of the anti-
GM feeling in the international market. The AWB has asserted that they can supply 
certified non-GM wheat, and that they will not sell GM wheat in the near future 
(GENET-news, 2000). 
A group of agricultural academics (Fulton, Furtan, Gray, and Khachatourians, 
2003) at the University of Saskatchewan, in an editorial, urged the government of 
Canada to learn its lesson from BSE in licensing and commercialization of GM wheat. 
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The group of experts suggests that the experience of lost markets for Canadian beef 
because of one cow infected by BSE might be repeated for the Canadian wheat industry 
if GM wheat is introduced. The group indicates that licensing GM wheat will jeopardize 
the export market of Canada to the EU and Japan. The message of the group to Ottawa 
was very clear: “GM wheat may be great, but our markets don’t want it. Listen up, 
Ottawa: We want those markets”.  
2.6. Conclusion 
Agricultural resources are degrading and an increase in the productivity of those 
resources is needed to increase food production. Biotechnology may be a powerful tool 
to achieve a more food secure world. However, consumer concerns have to be taken 
seriously for those benefits to be achieved. Consumers should be insured against any 
potential problems that those alternatives could pose (FAO, 1999). Consumer 
acceptance is necessary for the development and realization of biotechnology benefits in 
agriculture. If consumer mistrust is not resolved, the benefits that biotechnology may 
offer will be proven to be empty promises, and categorized as propaganda. 
The effects of biotechnology should be analyzed not only from the scientific and 
economic perspectives, but also from a human perspective. Food security is a 
humanitarian problem that biotechnology may play a role in solving. Fear of the 
unknown is a human trait, and GM food raises these fears despite the potential benefits. 
This study will assess the potential for fears of GM food to deprive the food insecure 
from a tool that could help them to ease their hunger and end their struggle to get enough 
food to survive.  
The next chapter offers a review of the literature surrounding food security 
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models, effects of technical change, climate change, and adoption model and identifies 


























CHAPTER 3 :  LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.0. Introduction 
In this thesis, four areas are combined to construct a global food security model 
that allows dynamic economic responses to opposition to GM food. These areas are: (1) 
food security; (2) environment effects on food security; (3) technical change or 
economic effects of GM crops; and (4) opposition to GM crops and the diffusion of this 
technology. This chapter reviews the literature in these areas, and identifies the 
limitations of that work. This chapter also highlights the complex nature of the 
relationship between biotechnology and food security, and shows this relationship 
depends on many factors external to biotechnology. 
3.1. Food security models 
The most commonly used food security models are designed to forecast future 
production, consumption, and prices. These forecast models include short, medium, and 
long run models. Three short to medium runs models dominate: 
- The FAPRI baseline forecast model to the year 2005.9 
- The OECD AGLINK forecast model to the year 2000.10 
                                                 
9 See Antle et al, 1999 for more details about the FAPRI model 
10 See OECD, 1996 for application of the AGLINK model 
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- The Food Security Assessment Model (FSAM) developed by US Department 
of Agriculture (USDA).11 
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) operates a longer run 
model called the International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities 
and Trade (IMPACT) (Rosegrant et al, 1995)12. All of these forecast models are multi-
commodity, multi-country econometric models, which permit the interaction between 
agricultural commodity markets and trade links between countries. The complexity of 
these models depends on the number of countries and commodities included in the 
analysis. Each of these models provide a system of demand and supply equations to 
forecast commodity prices. 
All of these models make key assumptions, and modifying these key 
assumptions will result in new scenarios. The key assumptions usually include: 
- Agricultural policies: This includes whether the present agricultural policies 
will change or not, or whether or not trade agreements such as WTO are 
binding with respect to a specific country or region. 
- Global and individual country economic growth, as well as population 
growth: these assumptions along with endogenous changes in commodity 
prices determine demand. 
- Yield growth and production growth for specific regions: These are used to 
determine the commodity supply. 
                                                 
11 See Deininger and Shapouri 2003 for application of the FSAM 
12 For more details about this model see also Rosegrant et al 1997; Rosegrant et al 1998, Rosegrant et al 2001. 
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These models have several drawbacks. The first drawback is that they do not 
take into account the fact that both crop yield and production have shown a degree of 
stagnation, partially due to environmental degradation caused by agriculture (Conway, 
1997). These models also have ignored environmental factors such as weather 
fluctuations, which could lead to sizable food production shortfalls and deterioration in 
food security in many parts of the world (see Pinstrup-Andersen et al, 1999b)  The last 
drawback is that the effect of a promising agricultural technology, such as 
biotechnology, is never quantified in those models. 
3.2. Effect of Climate Change 
Assessing the effect that climate change may have on global food security is the 
subject of an abundant literature. Some researchers argue that the overall effect of 
climate change on food supply is expected to be negligible on a global scale. This 
argument is based on the assumptions that farmers will take the necessary measures to 
adapt to climate change, and by the beneficiary effect of the additional CO2 on yields 
(Adams and Hurd, 1999). However other researchers such as Grechen et al (1990) 
suggested that climate change will have a devastating effect on agriculture and the 
human population. He predicted that several hundreds of millions to a billion people 
could die of hunger in future decades because of climate change.  
3.3. Effect of technical change 
3.3.1. Economic effect of GM crops 
The literature offers relatively few quantitative studies on GM crops and their 
global economic effect (Marra, 2001). This lack of economic research is due mainly to 
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the limited information on the economic benefit of GM crops and the insufficiency of 
the multidisciplinary approach in the ex ante studies (Fishel, 1987; Havlicek, 1990; 
Chan-Halbrendt, 1996). Most studies trying to estimate the economic impact of the 
adoption of GM crops have used some measure of farm level effects. In most models, 
the study period was a single time period, and there is an assumed degree of GM- 
induced productivity growth, reduction in overall production costs, or increase in profit 
for the selected crops in regions included in the studies. Most of those studies calculated 
the aggregated benefits using the framework offered by Alston, Norton and Pardey 
(1998) for estimating changes in producer and consumer surplus due to technical 
change. This approach is inadequate for the study of the impacts of innovations such as 
agricultural biotechnology since those impacts are dynamic and are not constant over 
time (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978).  
In their study of the global effects of Roundup Ready (RR) soybeans, Moschini 
et al (2000) assumed a US$20 per hectare increase in profit for farmers due the adoption 
of this technology. Flack-Zepeda et al (1999) have assumed supply shifts in the United 
States and the rest of the world (ROW) due to the adoption of insect tolerant (Bt) cotton 
and herbicide tolerant soybeans13. Nielsen and Anderson (2001) and Anderson et al 
(2001) assumed a 5% productivity growth due to the adoption of GM maize and soybean 
in different regions. Adoption of those maize and soybean was also estimated to reduce 
the cost of production by $9.5/acre and $6/acre respectively (Barkley, 2002).  
                                                 
13A gene of a soil bacterium called Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) is inserted through biotechnology into the 
genome of a specific crop to give resistance to a selected variety of crop pests. Cottonne is so far the most 
widely commercialized Bt crop. Herbicide-tolerant crops are engineered to enable crops to resist doses of 
herbicides that would otherwise kill them. Roundup Ready crops are manufactured by the multinational 
company Monsanto, the producer of the herbicide known commercially as Roundup.  
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3.3.2. Estimated economic effect of GM wheat 
3.3.2.1. Farm level impacts  
There are several benefits associated with the introduction of GM wheat. 
According to Monsanto Ltd, Roundup Ready wheat has an 11% to 14% yield advantage 
over conventional wheat. Blackshaw and Harker (2002) indicated a wider interval of 
yield advantage ranging from 4% to 16%. Monsanto (2001), suggests that the use of 
Roundup Ready wheat will improve and simplify weed management resulting in some 
yield benefit. Roundup Ready wheat provides growers with a much simpler and more 
efficient weed control system (Monsanto,2001). With Roundup Ready wheat, farmers 
can control a wide range of weeds with a single active ingredient in comparison to the 
current practice of 2- 3 active ingredient applications (Ogg and Jackson, 2001). 
Holzman (2001) studied the farm level impact of the introduction of Roundup 
Ready wheat in Western Canadian crop rotations. Under the assumption that Roundup 
Ready wheat will have a yield advantage of 6% and cost saving of $20.75 per acre, the 
author found that while farmers will benefit from the adoption of Roundup Ready wheat, 
those benefits are highly sensitive to management practices of individual farmers. Some 
researchers (such as Holzman et al. 2001) suggest that the engineered herbicide 
tolerance of Roundup Ready wheat may reduce the level of herbicide injury in wheat.  
This was supported by the work of Rauch and Thill ( 2001) that found no injury to the 
transgenic wheat in any field experiments. 
Gianessi et al (2002) conducted a study on Herbicide Tolerant wheat in Montana, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. They estimated that the adoption rate of 
the Roundup Ready wheat in those states would be equal to one-third of the spring 
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wheat acres. This level of adoption results in an income increase of $12 per acre, and a 
production increase of 24 million bushels of wheat. 
A report released by CNN (2003) said that any economic benefit from GM crops 
in Britain will likely be limited in the short-term, because of the limited GM crops that 
are suited to British conditions and the strong consumer opposition to GM food. The 
report recognized that GM crops have the potential to benefit both farmers and 
consumers. However, the report highlighted that whether those benefits outweigh the 
costs will depend on public attitudes and the capacity of the regulatory system to 
manage uncertainties. 
One of the costs associated with the introduction of GM wheat is the risk of 
contamination of conventional wheat supplies by GM wheat, either at the production or 
marketing levels. At the production level contamination may occur through volunteer 
wheat, cross pollination and co-mingling with GM wheat. At the marketing level 
contamination may happen in the elevator, in conveyor systems or elsewhere. Although 
cross-pollination risk in the case of wheat is very low, it still may occur (Staniland et al. 
2000; Hucl and Matus-Cadiz, 2001). The cross-pollination risks in wheat are lower than 
in some other crops such as corn (Eastham and Sweet, February 2002). Nevertheless, 
concerns of wheat breeders about possible contamination led the Canadian Agriculture 
Department, in 2001, to put an end to a GM field trials at the Agriculture Canada 
experimental farm in Indian head Saskatchewan (Agnet, March 25, 2003). Anti-GM 
groups argue that releasing GM will end the purity of wheat, and that the segregation of 
non-GM wheat from GM wheat will be impossible or very expensive. This will lead to 
farmers losing any choice to plant or sell GM-free wheat. Anti-GM groups also argue 
that widespread GM contamination in non-GM crop fields impose additional herbicide 
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cost for non-adopters, in order to keep an acceptable level of genetic purity (Downey 
and Beckie, 2002). Furtan et al. 2003 makes this same argument and indicate this effect 
makes the decision irreversible.  Furthermore, this may reduce the choice of being an 
organic wheat farmer and threaten the future of organic industry (e.g. Hoffman and 
Beaudoin v. Monsanto). However, others argue that it is possible to meet acceptable 
levels of purity, and that it is possible to find low cost and efficient ways to segregate 
non-GM from GM crops (Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes, 2000; Smyth and Phillips, 
2002; Wilson and Dahl, 2002). 
3.3.3.2. National and global impacts 
Several studies have addressed national and/or global impacts of GM wheat; 
however, their findings were at variance because of the different assumptions. For 
example, Stone et al (2002) found that in the long-run Australia would lose its wheat 
and oilseeds export market to the USA and Canada if those countries adopt GM 
technology (including GM wheat) while Australia does not. However, they ignored the 
fact that consumer opposition may wipe out any gains to productivity that GM 
technology may give to its adopters.   DeVuyst et al (2001) developed a mathematical 
programming model to investigate the effect of the introduction of GM wheat on 
international trade. In this model, they assume a 4.8% cost saving for GM versus non-
GM wheat. Their findings indicate that the introduction of GM wheat benefits consumer 
worldwide. US producers win in all scenarios except when GM wheat is widely adopted. 
In all scenarios it is assumed that developing countries will still import GM wheat under 
the assumption that food safety is not the main concern and that their priority is to meet 
the needs of their own people. This is a strong assumption since it excludes any role for 
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developing countries in the controversy over GM wheat, and assumes away the potential 
of consumers in developing countries exerting their purchasing power to reject or slow 
the adoption of the technology. The authors assumed that countries might reject the 
import of GM wheat, but still import non-GM wheat. This is unlikely because many 
countries have reported that they will reject the import of all wheat at once, if GM wheat 
is introduced, because it is difficult and costly to segregate GM and non-GM wheat. The 
authors also underestimate the loss of exports because of the introduction of GM wheat, 
since they limit the loss to only one market (Mexico). DeVuyst et al, (2001) concluded 
that the US may have first mover advantage (will gain by adopting GM wheat before 
other countries) even when importers reject GM wheat. In contrast Furtan et al (2004) 
concluded that neither Canada nor the USA has first mover advantage from the approval 
of GM wheat, and that producers in the first country approving GM wheat will suffer a 
loss. This conclusion was realized under the assumption that segregation of GM and 
non-GM wheat to the low tolerance level of many of the wheat importing countries is 
not affordable. 
Kuntz (2001) examined the effect of the introduction of Roundup Ready wheat 
on western Canada. He indicated that a third of Canadian wheat exports may need to be 
diverted to other markets due to rejection in ten “at risk” countries. Kuntz (2001) has 
defined countries at risk as countries that have expressed, according to the Canadian 
Wheat Board, that they will stop importing wheat if GM wheat is introduced in Canada. 
Creating other markets is not costless as GM wheat would need to be priced lower than 
conventional wheat to attract “GM tolerant” buyers. 
Wisner (2002) found that in the short run (2 to 6 years) US exports of hard red 
spring wheat would suffer a loss of around 30-50% and farm prices would decline by 
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anywhere from 32-35% if GM wheat is introduced. The author emphasized the difficulty 
and the high cost of creating and operating a dual marketing system of GM and non-GM 
wheat. The author also questions whether buyers would pay for the additional cost of 
segregation while non GM wheat can be purchased from other countries. 
 3.4. Diffusion models of agricultural technology  
3.4.1. Consumer opposition in the adoption process 
In the literature, opposition to GM food, as reflected in consumer resistance, has 
not been recognized as an influencing factor in the adoption process. Rather, it is usually 
considered as a factor influencing demand of GM food, locally or internationally. 
Barkley (2002) introduced opposition to GM food as a factor leading to a reduction of 
demand by foreign buyers. Anderson et al. (2001) also introduced opposition to GM 
food as a factor leading to a consumption ban on imports from GM producing countries. 
Biotechnology companies and food producers did not take European consumer 
resistance to GM food seriously. Efforts were and are still concentrating on advertising 
for the benefits of this technology rather than tackling consumer concerns directly. 
Consumer opposition to this relatively recent technology was thought to be temporary. 
However, the rejection of GM food by Europe and Japan has persisted, and has 
translated into compulsory labeling that restricts the import of GM food.  
3.4.2. Review of diffusion models 
Diffusion is generally defined as the process by which a successful innovation 
gradually becomes broadly used through adoption by firms or individuals (Jaffe et al., 
2000). Most diffusion models of GM crops ignore the power of consumers because the 
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direct agronomic benefits to farmers are assumed to be the main forces driving the 
diffusion. Most of the studies that model agricultural innovation diffusion claim that the 
variation of diffusion in different regions is explained by differences in “farm factors” 
such as profitability or expected return from the adoption of the new technology 
(Griliches, 1957; Mansfield, 1961; Schulz, 1964; and Dixon, 1980).  However, these 
farm acceptance factors are related to how the final users of the farm product perceive 
the new technology. If consumers perceive the new technology as a risk for them or for 
the environment, they may not accept the farm product, thereby reducing the incentive 
for farmers to adopt the technology. Recently, concerns of farmers in North America 
about possible introduction of GM wheat show that the strong consumer opposition in 
Europe and Japan to GM food cannot be ignored. Researchers such as Hanf and Böcker 
(2002) argued that that consumer rejection to GM food is the major reason why 
diffusion rates of GM crops appeared to stagnate in the early 2000s, even in the USA.  
In this section, several diffusion models that vary according to their assumptions 
about diffusion parameters are reviewed. Diffusion curves are based on the notion that 
the current adoption rate is a function, not only of the current level of adoption in region 
i at time t (θit), but also on the ultimate or long run adoption or ceiling level in that 
region (Ki). The diffusion rate (or adoption change) of the technology in region i at time 
t can be given by: 
dθit /dt = f (Ki, θit, t)         (3.1) 
Most diffusion models assume that the diffusion rate is proportional to the 
difference between the ceiling level and the current level of adoption. These specific 
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models are called “basic diffusion models” (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985). The basic 
diffusion models take the following functional form: 
 dθit/dt = git [Ki- θit]                     (3.2) 
This basic model contains four components: existing level of adoption (θit), time 
(t), the social system in which the innovation is being adopted, and channels of 
communication. The effect of the two last components is found in the diffusion 
coefficient git (Knudson, 1991). The diffusion coefficient indicates how fast the adoption 
level approaches the ceiling level.14 Assumptions about this function lead to different 
types of diffusion models. If the coefficient of diffusion where git= Φi θit is the natural 
rate of diffusion, the resulting logistic diffusion model would be: 
dθit/dt =  Φi θit [Ki- θit]         (3.3) 
The unit of θi in the case of agriculture innovation often refers to percentage of 
acreage under adoption. The parameter Φi is the rate of acceptance of the innovation 
(also called natural rate of diffusion or rate of growth coefficient) in the region i. This 
model is referred to as the internal influence model or static logistic model. It was used 
by Griliches (1957) to estimate the diffusion rate of hybrid corn in the United States. 
This model is also known as the “contagious” or “epidemic” model in biology (Jaffe et 
al., 2000) in which the innovation spreads like a disease. According to Knudson (1991) 
the adoption process being modeled should satisfy six basic assumptions. Specifically, 
the six basic assumptions (A1-A6) of static diffusion models are:   
• (A1) An individual either adopts or does not adopt;  
                                                 








• (A2) There is a fixed, finite ceiling K;  
• (A3) The coefficient of diffusion is fixed over time;  
• (A4) Once introduced, the innovation is not modified and its diffusion is 
independent from the diffusion of other innovations;  
• (A5) One adoption is permitted per adopting unit and this decision cannot 
be rescinded;  
• (A6) A social system’s geographical boundaries stay constant over the 
diffusion process.  
The logistic model imposes an S-shaped symmetric diffusion trend where a 
maximum rate of diffusion occurs at the inflection point, which is fixed at half of the 
ceiling (Ki/2). 15 It is based on Mansfield’s idea that diffusion is a process of imitation 
resulting from interpersonal contact among groups of homogenous producers. While 
some empirical studies have found the maximum rate of diffusion may occur earlier than 
the point of inflection Ki/2 (Shampine, 1998), it is common to use the traditional logistic 
model in agricultural innovations for its relative simplicity (Griliches, 1957; Jarvis, 
1981; Knudson, 1991). 
The logistic model can also be presented as the following equation (after 
integration of equation 3.3 and log transformation):  
ln[θit/(Ki-θit)] = ai + Φi t        (3.4) 
                                                                                                                                                
 
15To find the maximum adoption rate differentiate equation 3 with respect to time; d2θit / /dt2 = Φi  (Ki – 2 θit* )= 0 or 
θit* = Ki/2. The maximum diffusion rate occurs when 50% of the potential adopters have adopted, making the 
diffusion trend symmetric.   
 
 55
The ai parameter is a constant and it measures the adoption at time t = 0, the year 
agricultural technology is first introduced (considered the base time period). The term ai 
is the constant of integration which positions the curve on the time scale for the region i 
(Griliches, 1957). Assumptions A2 and A3 -- that parameters determining the diffusion 
rate (Φi, Ki) are fixed over time-- allow the static logistic model to be a useful tool for 
forecasting future adoptions since no exogenous variables are needed and future 
adoption rates can be predetermined by simple extrapolation (for examples see Griliches 
1957 and Mansfield 1961). However those simplifications limit what the model can say 
about the underlying dynamic process at work (Besley, 1993). In addition, the static 
diffusion model, because of assumption A5, does not allow the decline in adoption rates. 
 The assumptions of the static logistic model mentioned above suggest its 
unsuitability for crop biotechnology innovation, since adoption of agricultural 
technology is often a dynamic process. If some of the assumptions of static logistic 
diffusion are relaxed, for example allowing the rate of acceptance or the ceiling to 
change over time, we obtain a dynamic diffusion model. If the ceiling is allowed to 
change over time as a function of exogenous variables, the model is called the variable-
ceiling logistic model (Jarvis, 1981; Knudson, 1991). This model is represented by the 
following equation: 
ln[θit /(Kit-θit)] = ai + Φi t        (3.7) 
Two drawbacks of the variable-ceiling logistic model are that there is no 
guarantee that the ceiling will stay at theoretically justifiable levels (less than 1 or 100%) 
or that the equation will converge when the data are extremely nonlinear (Dixon, 1980). 
If only the slope (Φi ) is allowed to change but the ceiling is kept at a fixed justifiable 
 56
level, the diffusion model is called the dynamic variable slope logistic model and could 
be written as: 
ln[θit /(Ki--θit)] = ai + Φit t         (3.8) 
This model allows the rate of slope to vary. This model is easy to estimate and 
does not have the drawbacks of the variable ceiling logistic model for estimations using 
non-linear data. 
3.5. Assessment of the food security literature 
The evaluation of the effects of biotechnology on food security in 
developing countries is extremely complex, since these effects may vary by 
country, by sector as well as by segments of population (Leisinger, 1996), and 
because very few developing countries have experience with biotechnology 
(Qaim, and Virchow, 2000). In this section the complexity of studying the effect 
of biotechnology (genetic engineering) on food security in developing countries 
is explained graphically. This section shows whether the effect of biotechnology 
on food security for a given group or region is positive or negative depends on 
many other factors external to this technology.  
The relationship between different factors affecting food insecurity is 
presented for the case of a small country (Figure 3.1).  Food insecurity curves are 
used to identify and interpret the effect of biotechnology on food security at 
different levels (local, and household). The total supply curve is the domestic 
supply curve modified by stocks and imports. The demand curve shows total 
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quantity of food demanded (effective market demand) at different prices. The 
aggregate food requirement “R”, could be measured in calories16.  
 
Figure 3.1 – Aggregate food situation and food insecurity curves for a given country 
 
In Panel B, we distinguish three types of food insecurity: 
- Domestic supply insecurity is the gap between the aggregate food 
requirement (R) and the domestic supply of a given country. This 
indicator is a measure of the ability of a country to rely on its own 
food production to solve its food insecurity problem.  
-  Total supply insecurity is the gap between the food requirement (R) 
and total supply (comprising total food production, food stocks plus 
imports minus exports). This is a measure of food insecurity for 
countries that are able to complement the supplies from domestic 
production by food imports. 
                                                 
16 Food requirements could be estimated in term of calorie or staple food requirements. The more unequally the food 
is distributed the higher the aggregate food requirements. 
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-  Demand or consumption insecurity (or income-related food insecurity) is the 
gap between the requirement (R) and the effective demand. This is a measure 
of access to food, since food can be abundant but some people may be unable 
to access it due to their insufficient incomes.  
Countries will be affected differently by biotechnology depending on whether 
the country is a net exporter or net importer of food and whether it can apply new 
technologies on a national scale (Commandeur and von Roozendaal, 1993; Leisinger, 
1996). The effect of biotechnology on food insecurity in net importer “country i” is 
presented by Figure 3.2. 
 
 Figure 3.2 – Effect of biotechnology on food insecurity in country i 
In Panel a, “country i” is a net importer and has a low technological capacity. In 
this case biotechnology is adopted by exporters. By reducing cost of production or by 
increasing crop productivity, biotechnology may lead to a decrease in the world price 
from Pm to Pm’. This price decline leads to a reduction of demand insecurity from level 
a to a’ due to the ability to increase food imports. This improvement in food security 
(decrease in food insecurity) for this country is a short term benefit, since lower prices 
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price reduce domestic supply (domestic supply insecurity could be worsened (from b to 
b’). The additional dependence on imports implies a greater risk from world price 
shocks.  
In Panel b, “country i” is a net importer and has strong technological capacity. In 
this country, farmers are able to apply biotechnology themselves. Biotechnology (higher 
yielding varieties for example) leads to a rightward shift of the domestic supply curve, 
which means a decline of domestic and total supply insecurity. A price decline (from P0 
to Pm) increases the real income, which enhances the aggregate demand leading to a 
decline in demand insecurity (from c to c”). The domestic supply insecurity is also 
reduced (from b to b”), which means that this country is moving toward food security. 
Similar analysis can be done for net exporting countries. The effect of 
biotechnology on food security in a net exporter country depends on the speed of 
introducing and the capacity of using the new technology compared to its competitors. 
Therefore, net exporter countries unable to introduce biotechnology at the same speed as 
the fastest competitors will have a substantial reduction in their export earnings. The 
decrease of income due to this reduction in exports leads to a left shift of the aggregate 
demand, and thus an increase of demand insecurity. This could be the case of many 
African countries for which agricultural products represent more than 60 percent of their 
total export income. In those countries, biotechnology could (at the extreme) lead to a 
disaster, since a large population will have less income, making them unable to access 
the food they need. However, if African countries could take advantage of this 
technology, their export earnings could increase and so could their ability to buy more 
food and decrease the food insecurity and hunger of their people.  
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In the analysis of the effect of biotechnology on food security of a given country, 
further factors may be important in addition to whether a country is a net exporter or 
importer of agricultural products. These factors include how agriculture is structured 
(importance of large-scale farming against smallholders), the income structure (number 
of low-income consumers compared to high-income consumers) and the degree of 
income distribution.  
The numbers 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 3.3 represent households with low, medium 
and high income respectively. The household food requirement in calories is “Rh”. 
Looking at the second panel, a1 (Rh-A1) and a2 (Rh –A2) are the food insecurities of 
households 1 and 2 at the price. The food insecurity level at which a household would 
starve is a1’ (Rh-A1’). 
In developing countries, small farmers are usually the main cohorts of low-
income households. If a GM technology that target crops mainly cultivated by small 
farmers and consumed by poor consumers (those crops are usually for local 
consumption only) is available and widely adopted by small farmers, those farmers will 
benefit from the technology owing to the productivity growth in cultivating the GM 
crop.17 This can lead to an increase in small farmers’ income. Therefore, households of 
small farmers could become medium income (not low-income) consumers. This means 
that food demand of small households will shift from level 1 to a higher level (level 2 for 
example) in panel a. This in turn lead to a shift of food insecurity level from level 1 
(dangerous level) to level 2 (a safer level) in panel b. In this case, biotechnology might 
not only be advantageous for the poorest people (small farmers and low-income 
                                                 
17 See the examples of virus-resistant sweet potatoes in Kenya and Mexico (Qaim and Virchow, 2000). 
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households), but it might also contribute to decreasing income inequality in a given 
country (Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3 – Desegregation of demand insecurity 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The potential impact of biotechnology will be a function of consumer perception 
to GM food. This chapter argues that the evaluation of the biotechnology effect should 
be dynamic rather than static, and should treat consumer opposition as an endogenous 
factor in the adoption decision of biotechnology rather than an exogenous one. It is 
unlikely that the opposition to GM food will disappear in the near future. Consumers’ 
“right to know” and labeling requirements will create formidable barriers to trade. This 
opposition will have an effect on global food production and trade. While the adoption 
of GM crops will increase food security an empirical modeling approach is needed to 
estimate the magnitude of these benefits.  
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In Chapter 4, the four areas identified in this chapter are combined to develop a 
global food security model that can be used to simulate scenarios to evaluate the 





CHAPTER 4 : MODELING THE EFFECT OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ON FOOD 
SECURITY: THE CASE OF GM WHEAT 
4.0. Introduction 
This chapter deals with modeling the impact of GM market acceptance on GM 
adoption rates and, ultimately, global food security. A production model is used to 
estimate the impact of GM market acceptance (or lack thereof) on GM adoption rates 
and the impact this will have on supply. A stochastic simulation model is then used to 
estimate the impacts on price levels and future global food security. By construction the 
model ignores many exogenous variables that will impact food security but are not 
affected by the GM acceptance.   
4.1. Development of global food security model 
A market model is combined with a GM adoption model to create a global food 
security model (Figure 4.1), which allows dynamic economic responses to food 
production shocks, such as climate change. GM corn is used to develop the adoption 
model for GM wheat, since wheat is not commercialized yet. In the adoption model, the 
rate of adoption of GM wheat is affected by major importers’ policies through trade. The 
adoption rate depends on the diffusion of this technology, which is driven by consumer 
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perception of the technology. The market model consists of both a supply and a demand 
side. The wheat supply in any given year is the sum of the previous year’s stock and the 
current year’s production. The quantity of wheat stock each year is estimated using a 
stock equation. Production is divided into a yield forecast and acreage responses. The 
acreage function permits the estimation of the total acreage planted with wheat. The 
yield forecast depends on assumptions about the productivity increases provided by GM 
and conventional wheat and the adoption rate of GM wheat. Yield forecasts of 
conventional wheat are estimated from the historical data. The yield forecast of GM 
wheat is estimated under specific assumptions. The realized yields depend on the climate 
and environmental shocks assumed to be random is this study. The demand side consists 
of consumption determined by a linear equation. 
The adoption and market model are combined to compute the food security 
elements (Figure 4.1). The level of food security is assessed using several factors, 
including: real wheat prices, which are a good measure of food security as lower real 
wheat price translate into cheaper imports for developing countries; consumption, which 
measures whether access to food has improved or not; ending stocks, which measure 
whether supply outweighs demand; and volatility of prices and the probability of high 
prices, which tests the stability of global food security.18  
 
 
                                                 
18 The use of word grain (in this case wheat) market conditions such as world stock levels and prices has been used as 



















































The main goal of this analysis is to provide the change in food security elements 
such as price, consumption, and ending stocks rather that forecasting their values. The 
analysis also provides an estimate of changes in terms of number of undernourished 
people in developing countries by 2030 due to the opposition to GM wheat.19 
4.2. Adoption model 
In 2000, the global acreage of GM corn was equal to 10.3 million hectares 
occupying the second largest area after GM soybean and 23% of the total area sown for 
GM crops (James, 2000). GM corn was first adopted by Canada and the USA in 1996. 
The acreages of GM corn in these countries were 0.001 million ha for Canada and 0.3 
million ha the US, representing respectively an adoption rate of 0.1% for Canada and 
1% for the US. Argentina adopted GM corn in 1997, followed by other countries 
including Mexico, France and South Africa in 1998 (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 – Development of GM corn area (million ha) 




Argentina 0 0.07 0.09 0.31 0.28 12.3 9 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.00 2.1 
Canada 0.001 0.27 0.3 0.5 0.4 43.8 36.8 
France 0 0 0.002 0.001 0.01 0.1 0.5 
Germany 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.0 2.7 
Portugal 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.5 0.0 
Mexico 0 0 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.7 1.4 
South Africa 0 0 0.05 0.16 0.15 4.5 3.9 
USA 0.3 2.27 8.66 10.3 9.9 36.1 33.6 
Total 0.30 2.61 9.15 11.33 10.3 8 7 
Source: James (1995-2000) 
                                                 
19 The numbers and proportion of undernourished people in each developing country is a food security indicator 
developed by the FAO This measure is the most widely used indicator of food insecurity (Smith et al, 1998). It gives 
the number and proportion of people in each country or region who are consuming insufficient dietary energy to meet 
their requirements (See FAO, 1996b for more details about this measure). 
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In 2000, the global adoption level of GM corn was 7%.  Canada has the highest 
adoption level of around 37% followed by the USA with an adoption level equal to 
33.6%, Argentina with a 9% adoption level, and South Africa with a 4% adoption level. 
The adoption level in European countries did not exceed 3% level. The global adoption 
rate as well as adoption in most countries especially in Argentina, Canada and the USA 
has declined significantly between 1999 and 2000 (Table 4.1). 
Knowing that the highest adopters of GM corn are countries where consumers 
are tolerant to GM food, and that the lowest adopters are countries where consumers are 
strongly oppose this technology an important question arises: Could consumer 
opposition explain the difference of GM adoption rates between different countries as 
well as the change in the diffusion of this technology in a given country as well as 
globally?. 
Diffusion is generally defined as the process by which a successful innovation 
gradually becomes broadly used through adoption by firms or individuals (Jaffe et al., 
2000). Most models of diffusion of GM crops ignore the power of consumers with the 
direct agronomic benefits to farmers assumed to be the main forces driving the diffusion. 
Most of the studies modeling diffusion of agricultural innovations claim that the 
variation of diffusion in different regions is explained by differences in “farm factors” 
such as profitability or expected return from the adoption of the new technology 
(Griliches, 1957; Mansfield, 1961; Schultz, 1964; and Dixon, 1980). However, these 
farm acceptance factors are related to how the final users of the farm product perceive 
the new technology. If consumers perceive the new technology as a risk for them or for 
the environment, they may not accept the farm product, thereby reducing the incentive 
for farmers to adopt the technology. Recently, concerns of farmers in North America 
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about possible introduction of GM wheat show that the strong consumer opposition in 
Europe and Japan to GM food cannot be ignored. In the literature, opposition to GM 
food, as reflected in consumer resistance, has not been recognized as an influencing 
factor in the adoption process. Rather, it is usually considered as a factor influencing 
demand of GM food, locally or internationally. Barkley (2002) estimated the opposition 
to GM food by numerical factor (-1,0), reflecting demand reductions by foreign buyers. 
Anderson et al. (2001) also introduced opposition to GM food as a factor leading to a 
consumption ban on imports from GM producing countries. 
My approach formally incorporates consumer response into the diffusion 
decision. Given that GM wheat is not yet available, I use a variable-slope dynamic 
diffusion model for GM corn to investigate the effect of consumer opposition on 
diffusion and adoption of GM technology. Using the available data about GM corn 
adoption,20 I model the diffusion paths in the EU and 23 countries to identify the effect 
of local and foreign tolerance to GM food on the path of propagation of crop 
biotechnology.21 The underlying assumptions in the model are that consumers in several 
countries oppose GM corn, to varying degrees, and that farmers will react to such 
opposition through their adoption rates of this technology. By reviewing different 
diffusion models in section 3.4.2, I demonstrated that the dynamic variable-slope logistic 
model (equation 3.8) is the most appropriate model for estimating diffusion of 
                                                 
20  The analysis is conducted using a sample of 39 countries for which biotechnology research statistics are available, 
and covers 5 years of adoption of GM corn (1996 to 2000).   
21 Adoption levels for GM corn are taken from various issues of Clive James, Global Review of Commercialized 




biotechnological innovations. Therefore the dynamic diffusion model for GM corn can 
be presented by equation (4.1) which is a restatement of equation (3.8): 
ln[θit/(Ki-θit)] = ai + Φit t        (4.1) 
The ai parameter, a constant, measures the adoption at time t = 0, the year a new 
agricultural technology is first introduced (considered the base time period). Adoption 
behavior is depicted by the percent of total acreage planted to the GM crop. The 
adoption ceiling (Ki) is fixed for all countries at 100% level indicating that the entire 
crop produced by the country is of the GM variety. The coefficient of diffusion Φit is a 
function of, f(Rit), where Rit is a vector of exogenous vectors affecting the diffusion 
coefficient. By defining f(Rit) as a function of foreign and national acceptance to GM 
food, Φ1 R1it + Φ2 R2it , this approach enables the measurement of the diffusion of GM 
crops for different countries. 
In order to capture some of the effect of consumer perceptions on rates of 
adoption, information on labeling requirements in each country were used to construct a 
tolerance index to GM food. The national tolerance index for country i (R1it) is intended 
to be a proxy for the local acceptability of GM food: 
i1it TR =           (4.2) 
The assumption is that the rate of adoption in a specific country is a function of local 
perception. In other words, consumers could oppose the introduction of a specific crop 
in their country on the basis of environmental concerns. The local tolerance level is 
taken to be inversely related to the stringency of the labeling requirements. That is, 
countries with voluntary labeling laws or with no labeling regulation altogether have a 
more tolerant attitude (higher Ti) toward GM food. In contrast countries with mandatory 
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regulation of 0% threshold on products containing genetically modified organisms are 
the least tolerant to GM food. The tolerance indexes are assigned to each country based 
on the threshold level for percentage of GM contamination of non-GM products. 
Therefore, a value of 0 is assigned to countries with a 0% threshold, 1 for a 1% 
threshold, 2 for a 2% threshold, 3 for 5% threshold levels, 4 for 10% and above, and 5 
where either voluntary or no labeling laws exist (See Appendix B.1 for local tolerance 
values). This method is reasonable given the limitation of information on consumer 
preferences. The highest adopters (Argentina, Canada, and the US) have the highest 
local tolerance, while slow adopters (France and Germany for example) have low local 
tolerance. 






)toExport(R         (4.3) 
where Tj is the tolerance level in importer country j approximated using the assumptions 
discussed above. It is assumed that the rate of adoption is a function of international 
market acceptance. Market acceptance is a function of the size of consumer demand for 
GM corn in export markets (see Table B.2 for foreign tolerance index values). The 
formula of R2it   suggests that country i will be affected the most by the labeling 
regulation (regarding a given product) of its most important trade partner. In other 
words, countries will take more seriously any labeling regulations or import restriction 
imposed on an export product coming from a trading partner that is a large importer of 
that product. Annual crop export data and production data are obtained from FAOSTAT 
online statistics (FAO, 2000). Based on this information the following relationship is 
developed:  
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Φit = Φ1 R1it + Φ2 R2it .       (4.4) 
Substituting Φit in equation (4.4) into the diffusion model (4.1), equation 4.5 is derived: 
ln[θit/(1-θit)] = ai + (Φ1 R1it + Φ2 R2it) t      (4.5) 
Country differences are accounted for by the term ai which represents the fixed effect, as 
we are dealing with panel data. If, at the initial year of introduction of the technology in 
the world (t=0), a country does not adopt this technology the term ai will be negative. 
However, if the country adopts the new technology at the initial year the term ai will be 
positive. Note that if the adoption rate (θit) is equal to zero the Ln[θit/(1-θit)] is invalid. 
To solve this problem we substitute ln[θit/(1-θit)] by ln[1 + θit/(1-θit)]. 22 Equation 4.5 
now becomes 
- Ln(1- θit ) = βi + (α1 R1it + α2 R2it) t       (4.6) 
Adding the error term ε , the diffusion equation can be estimated as: 
∆t =- Ln(1- θit ) = βi + α1 R1it t+ α2 R2it t +ε        (4.7) 
A negative intercept βi <0 means that there is no adoption at time zero in country i, 
while a positive value means the opposite. If diffusion is positive then the adoption rate 
in country i is equal to: 
θit = 1- e –(∆t)   if ∆t >0 and       (4.8) 
θit= 0    if ∆t <0      (4.9)  
As mentioned for the term ai, the term βi is country specific, and is related to the initial 
availability or development of the technology in country i.  
                                                 
22 ln[1 + θit/(1-θit)] = ln (1/(1-θit) ) = -ln(1-θit), and ln[θit/(1-θit)] = ln(θit) - ln(1-θit). At the limit (t→∞) :ln[1 + θit/(1-
θit)] = ln[θit/(1-θit)]. 
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To increase the accuracy of the parameter estimates, the diffusion model is 
estimated using cross-country panel data over 5 years (1996-2000) assuming similar 
coefficients (α1, and α2) for different countries (Please see that pooled data in Table B.3 
used for the regression) Although the coefficients of foreign and local tolerance 
variables are the same for all countries, the magnitude of those variables is different. The 
fixed effect model is used as a way to account for differences (technological) between 
producers in different countries. As a result, the model can perform well in cross-country 
analysis.   
An advantage of this diffusion model is that it permits the adoption reaction 
(increase or decrease) due to the change over time in consumer attitude (foreign and 
local tolerances) toward GM food locally or internationally. Therefore, this model is 
appropriate for describing the dynamics involving the adoption decision. Adopters may 
reduce the adoption of an old technology (GM corn) or hesitate to adopt a new one that 
are not yet commercialized (such as GM wheat) if they realize that the opposition to this 
technology (local or foreign) may cause them economic loss in the local or international 
market.  
It is expected that an increase in the magnitude of foreign and local tolerances 
would result in an increase in the demand for genetically engineered crops, inducing 
wider adoption of the technology. In other words, it is expected that if GM technology is 
more accepted locally and internationally that adoption will increase regionally as well 
as globally. Consequently, both tolerance terms are expected to have positive 




Table 4.2 – Estimation of the diffusion parameters (case of corn) 
Dependent Variable: Diffusion 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample: 1996 2000 
Included observations: 5 
Number of cross-sections used: 24 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 120 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Local Tolerance *t 0.003 0.001 2.73 0.008
Index of Foreign Tolerance *t 0.013 0.006 2.21 0.030
Fixed Effects         
Argentina -0.04    
Australia -0.04    
Brazil -0.02    
Bulgaria -0.02    
Canada 0.30    
China -0.02    
Czech Republic -0.01    
EU (15) -0.01    
Hungary -0.05    
India -0.03    
Israel -0.02    
Japan -0.02    
Korea -0.02    
Liechtenstein -0.02   
Mexico -0.02    
New Zealand -0.02    
Norway -0.02    
Poland -0.03    
Romania -0.02    
Russian Federation -0.02    
Slovakia -0.02    
South Africa -0.02    
Turkey -0.03    
United States 0.21       
R-squared 0.74     Mean dependent var 0.03
Adjusted R-squared 0.68     S.D. dependent var 0.10
S.E. of regression 0.06     Sum squared resid 0.30
F-statistic 272.84     Durbin-Watson stat 1.09
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00       
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The empirical results suggest that consumer opposition to GM food should be 
considered an endogenous variable in the adoption decision. Consumers’ opposition 
(acceptance) measured by local and foreign tolerance proved to be the main obstacle 
(driver) of adopting GM technology. Both coefficients of acceptability variables have 
the right sign (positive) and are significant. Both foreign tolerance and local tolerance 
seem to perform well (significant at 1%). The ability of the two tolerance indices to 
count for differences in the diffusion parameters between countries appears to be 
significant, with 74% of the variability of the diffusion of GM crop worldwide explained 
by only these two variables. 
The empirical results also suggest that both tolerance measures affect the 
diffusion rate, but foreign tolerance to GM food is more important than local tolerance23. 
This is expected, since corn is mainly destined for export. The significance of foreign 
tolerance suggests that foreign opposition to GM food could significantly limit the 
adoption of GM crops. This result helps to explain the hesitation of farmers to adopt GM 
wheat under the risk that they may lose export markets.  
The coefficients βi, α1, and α2 estimated in this section and presented in Table 
4.2 (for GM corn) are used to forecast the diffusion of GM wheat for specific countries 
(Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, and the USA). Foreign tolerance indices are re-
calculated to reflect wheat trade shares rather than corn markets. Export over production 
                                                 
23 The foreign and the local tolerance indices were calculated differently, therefore some may suggest that a direct 
comparison of estimated parameters is not possible. Therefore, I recalculated the local tolerance index as R1it = local 
consumption i/production i. This approach treats foreign and domestic sales symmetrically and makes the direct 
comparison between the two tolerance measures possible. The model is re-estimated, and the results are presented in 
Appendix B.4. The index of foreign tolerance is twice more economically significant in the adoption decision than 
local tolerance. The model now is slightly less fit than previously as the coefficient of determination declined slightly. 
The foreign tolerance became less statistically significant in this model. This could be explained by the fact that in this 
new model I used fewercountries due to lack of the data.   
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shares used to calculate the foreign tolerances are based on eleven-year averages (1990-
200) calculated from Canada Grains Council (2002). 
The global adoption rate of GM wheat at time t is θbt calculated as the area (ha) 









A        (4.10) 
where Ait is the hectares of wheat in country i (i.e. a potential adopter for GM wheat) at 
time t. θit is the adoption of GM wheat in country i at time t. At is the global acreage of 
wheat. SAit is the area share of country i from the global hectares. Area shares used to 
calculate the global adoption are based on ten-year averages (1991-2000) calculated 
from Canada Grains Council (2002) as presented in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 – Area shares of major wheat producers (ten-year average from 1991-2000) 
Country Average Acres (1000 ha) Average Share 
Argentina 5,412 2.5% 
Australia 10,036 4.6% 
Canada 11,803 5.4% 
China,  29,448 13.4% 
EU 16,965 7.7% 
USA 24,185 11.0% 
Source: (Canada Grains Council, 2002; and Author's calculations) 
4.3.The market and food security elements of the model 
The market and food security components of the GM diffusion model are 
outlined here for completeness. In this section the analysis focuses on the estimation of 
wheat yields for two periods: 1960-2005 and 2005-2030. The first period reflects the 
contribution of conventional wheat varieties to yield growth. The second is the period 
where GM wheat is expected to be introduced and adopted. The contribution of plant 
breeding to yield increase could range from 20% to 80% across different crops (Evans, 
1993). Huang et al (2002) reported that scientists and observers from different countries 
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(both developed and developing) have agreed that conventional technology will continue 
to contribute to the increases in productivity, and that by 2010 and beyond, 
biotechnology should have a major impact on yield increase. 
The yield growth of conventional wheat is forecasted under a constant yield 
growth assumption. In the report “World agriculture towards 2015/2030”, FAO (2002b) 
projected a yield growth of 1.1% per year between 2000 and 2030.  This yield growth is 
under the assumption that no more new technology will become available. This yield 
growth appears to be exaggerated if the historical trend is considered. Therefore in this 
model a rate of growth of 1.01% is assumed, which is implies that conventional 
technology will manage to maintain the rate of growth observed between 1989 and 
2002. The maximum obtainable yield minus the actual yield is defined as the yield gap. 
According to the “World Agriculture towards 2015/2030” report, most countries have a 
yield gap similar to that of France, which was around 20% in 1999.24  
GM technology may narrow the yield gap in the future.  According to 
Kalaitzandonakes (2003) over time GM crops should lead to higher yield through the 
reduction of production risks. According to Virmani et al (1993) it is possible to increase 
wheat yields (among other cereal yields) by as much as 20% just by extending hybrid 
variety development. For the development of the estimation it is assumed that the yield 
gap globally in 1999 is 20%. The maximum obtainable yield can be estimated at the 
global level using conventional varieties (in 1999): 
MaxYc1999 = (1+ yield gap1999)* Yc1999 = 3.30 tonne/Ha   (4.11) 
                                                 
24 This value is calculated as follow: yield gap = [(average obtainable yield-average actual yield)/average actual 
yield]*100. The values are taken from the FAO report. 
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Assuming conventional technology can keep the growth rate (gc) between the years 
2000 and 2030 at the level of annual yield growth in the period 1989-2002 (gc = 1.01%), 
the yield for conventional production at time t is: 
Yct = Yct-1(1+gc)         (4.12) 
In contrast the yield of conventional production in 2030 will be:  
Yc2030 = Y2002(1+0.0101)t-2002 = 3.57 tonne/Ha.    (4.13) 
If conventional technology can maintain the growth rate at 1.01%, the conventional 
yield would be unable to reach 4 tonne/ha by 2042. The value of 4 tonne/ha is thus used 
as the maximum yield for the conventional technology in the future decades.25 GM 
wheat may contribute to closing the yield gap from 2005 to time T: 
Ybt =Yct + 0.1 δ1 (t-2005) Yield gap2005     (4.14) 
The constant 0.1 is an assumed annual decrease in the yield gap due to biotechnology. 
Here it is assumed that this decrease is a linear function of time. The term δ1= 0 if the 
first generation of GM wheat is not developed or commercialized, and δ1=1 if it is 
commercialized. Before 2005, the term δ1 is equal to zero. Substituting Yct by its 
expression, the following equation representing biotechnology yield is: 
Ybt = Yc2005 (1+0.01) t-2005 + 0.1 δ1 (t-2005) Yield gap2005  (4.15) 
Solving this equation for the time when biotechnology will close the yield gap (T), it is 
determined that the yield gap is closed when 
YbT = MaxYct         (4.16) 
Substituting Ybt into equation 4.15 yields: 
Max Yct = Yc2005 (1+0.01) T-2005 + 0.1 (T-2005) Yield gap2005  (4.17) 
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Solving this equation for time (T) we find that the yield gap is closed in 2013. From 
2013 to 2030, the effect of biotechnology on yield depends on whether any subsequent 
generations are developed and commercialized or not. Gray et al (2001b) suggest that 
the introduction of GM crops will attract private investment to the industry and 
accelerate the yield growth rate by 50%, such that the biotechnology yield beyond 2013 
could be estimated by the following equation:      
 Ybt = Yb2013(1+ gc + δ2xg) (t-2013)      (4.18) 
where xg is the extra growth that biotechnology could offer. The term xg is assumed to 
be equal to (0.5 gc). The term δ2 equals 0 if the second generation of GM wheat is not 
developed or commercialized; it equals 1 if GM wheat is developed and 
commercialized. Here it is assumed that once the second generation is commercialized, 
it will totally substitute for the first generation since it is offers superior performance. 
Global yield of wheat is determined by: 
Yt = θbt Ybt + θct Yct = θbt Ybt + (1- θbt) Yct    (4.19) 
where θbt is the global adoption rate of GM wheat at time t, and θct is the global 
adoption rate of conventional wheat varieties at time t. 
Yield data of wheat from FAO (2004) database (FAOSTAT) is used to calculate 
yield variability. Under the assumption of no climate change, the random variables are 
generated each year to create a yield variability pattern resembling that of the period 
1989-2002. The expected variance is 1.6%, which is the yield variance that actually 
occurred over the period 1989-2002 (see Table 4.4). The yield variability for 1961-1974 
is chosen to serve as climate change value, since it is a midpoint between the other two 
                                                                                                                                                
25 This value is a long run upper limit and not technical maximum yield. 
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periods and therefore represents not the most variable or least variable conditions 
experienced over the last three decades.  Therefore, to simulate greater variability under 
the assumption of climate change the random variables are selected at random each year 
to create a pattern resembling that of period 1961-1974 (see Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4 – Historical wheat yield variability 
1961-1974 1975-1988 1989-2002 
Variance 3.85% 5.88% 1.59%
Standard deviation 19.61% 24.24% 12.62%
Source: Author’s calculations from FAO (FAOSTAT) 
 
Based on these simulated yield variability data the realized yield for the given year for 
each point j is estimated by: 
Yrt = Yt (1+ v)         (4.20) 
where v is a random variable generated based on the expected variance. The key 
parameters in the market model are the price elasticity of demand, price elasticity of area 
(or area response), and price elasticity of stock, which are based on other estimates. For 
the present study, the price elasticity of global consumption (or global demand) for 
wheat is chosen to be equal to –0.15.26 In this study, the global area elasticity is assumed 
equal to 0.5.27 The stock elasticity is calculated by dividing the demand elasticity by the 
average stock-to-use ratio in the 1961-2000 period using USDA data (in order to take 
                                                 
26 The overall elasticity of demand for wheat is regarded as highly inelastic. According to Alstonne et al (1997) the 
elasticity of demand for food wheat overall elasticity is equal to -0.2. In this study, the results did not change for the 
elasticity of demand in the range of –0.1 and –0.2. This range is similar to the one that Alstonne et al (1994) assumed 
for the overall elasticity of demand for milling wheat and durum wheat. Sullivan et al (1989) reported price elasticity 
of demand for major importers ranging from –0.1 to –0.4, with the rest of the world (ROW) having a demand 
elasticity equal to –0.25. Benirshka and Koo (1995) determine elasticities of demand for different countries and 
regions. The elasticity values vary from -0.005 for Japan to -0.3 for Australia. DeVuyst (2001) calculates the demand 
elasticity for the the rest of the world (ROW) from this data and it found it equal to -0.1.  
27 The intermediate-run value of acreage response was estimated by Alstonne et al (1994) to be equal to 0.5 (or less) 
for Canada and the rest of the world (ROW). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 
1986) estimates the supply elasticity to be 0.5 for the US and 0.46 for the EU.  
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into account the variability in stock-to-use ratio over the years), which yields a stock 
price elasticity of -0.55, indicating that storage is more responsive to price changes than 
consumption.  
 Global consumption at time t is estimated by equation 4.21. It is assumed that 
future global income growth will reduce the global consumption of wheat per capita 
(wheat is considered an inferior food) just enough to offset population increase. 
28Therefore the global consumption equation is: 
 GCt = a + b *Pt        (4.21) 
where a and b are the intercept and the slope of the consumption function respectively.  
The realized global production (PRt) is the most important variable for supply. Global 
production is the product of wheat acreage (At) and realized yield (Ytr). 
At = c + d*Pt          (4.22)  
where c and d are the intercept and the slope of the acreage function respectively.  
PRt = At Ytr         (4.23) 
The total global supply (GSt) of wheat is the sum of initial stock (st-1) and production. 
GSt= PRt + St-1         (4.24) 
where the term St-1 is the ending global stock from the previous year. The global stock 
equation is calculated as: 
 St = e + f *Pt         (4.25) 
where e and f are the intercept and the slope of the stock function respectively.  
                                                 
28 This assumption is mainly to simplify the modeling. A more complicated approach would be to assume that demand 
is affected by income growth, and population growth and adjust the demand each year according to income and 
population projections. However this will complicate the analysis since in this case it is necessary to break the demand 
growth by level of income and have different income elasticites of each income level. 
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The equilibrium condition is satisfied when total demand is equal to total supply. 
Solving for the price to ensure the equilibrium will provide the real price at time t: 
 GCt + St = GSt ⇒  *PtPt =      (4.26) 
 To check the effect of opposition to GM wheat on volatility of future prices, the 
expected prices—converted to inflation-adjusted terms using the US GDP price deflator 
index 2000—are arranged in two intervals. These intervals consist of low to medium 
expected prices [expected prices <High price], and high expected prices [expected prices 
≥ High price]. For each year, High Price is calculated as one standard deviation above 
the mean hence the high price would adjust as the mean price falls. 
The base price for wheat (for the year 2000) is estimated to be $145/tonne.29 
Consumption, acreage, and stock parameters are calibrated using this price. These 
specific calibrated parameters for the world are presented in Table 4.5. 






 a b C d e F 
World 682.4 -0.6 107.1 0.7 176.4 -0.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the adoption of GM crops is estimated as a function of consumer 
acceptance or tolerance. The results show that factors such as local and foreign 
tolerances to GM food may be not only the driving factors of diffusion of GM crops in 
the past, but may also control the future of this technology. The diffusion model 
developed is integrated into global food security models to predict the effect of GM 
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wheat on global food security under different scenarios of local or foreign tolerances. 
This global food security model is dynamic and responsive to environmental factors 
such as climate change as well as technology-related factors such as opposition to GM 
food. Chapter 5 will use the global food security model developed in this chapter to 


















                                                                                                                                                







CHAPTER 5 : SCENARIOS 
5.0. Introduction 
Opposition to GM crops is based on environmental and food safety concerns 
over GM food. On the other hand support for biotechnology is based on the promise of 
“great” benefit for both consumers and producers, and even the environment. The debate 
over what good or bad can come from this new technology was and still is the focus of 
an abundant literature. However, there is no study that connects opposition to this 
technology to its potential benefits. In this chapter, the effect of opposition to GM wheat 
on what biotechnology can offer in terms of global food security is examined and 
quantified.  This chapter presents quantitative analysis using the global food security 
model developed in the previous chapter. The adoption model is shocked with different 
levels of EU tolerance to GM wheat while the supply model is shocked by different 
assumptions about how future GM wheat may affect the yield growth along the GM 
wheat development path until the year 2030. The research will enrich the GM debates 
through quantitative work covering a wide range of scenarios combining both degrees of 
opposition to GM food and benefits.  
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5.1. Scenarios 
A number of scenarios were developed using the diffusion model specified in the 
previous chapters. Each of the scenarios represents a set of alternative conditions that 
may exist in future development paths. In all scenarios, it is assumed that agricultural 
biotechnology will target genetic modification of yield potential in wheat. This may be 
achieved by the development of GM wheat with multiple traits including pest resistance 
and yield increasing and could increase the yield growth effectively. Each of the 
scenarios developed is summarized in Table 5.1. 
Scenario 1.a involves the EU remaining GM resistant (GM free) even in the face 
of climate change. In this scenario, the EU opposition induces widespread opposition to 
GM wheat in major wheat importing countries. This widespread rejection of GM wheat 
would give no incentive for GM food producing countries to introduce GM wheat. 
Scenario 2.a involves the EU accepting GM crops in response to climate change. In this 
scenario, EU consumers have maximum tolerance to GM wheat. If the EU has 
maximum tolerance to GM wheat, it is most likely that EU wheat farmers will adopt GM 
wheat in order to avoid lagging behind other exporting countries in wheat productivity. 
EU acceptance of GM wheat will induce high consumer tolerance in major importing 
countries, since this European acceptance will be taken as endorsement of GM wheat 
and as an ending of the debate over the safety of GM food.  
The other scenarios where climate change is assumed are identified as Scenario 
1.b, 1.d, and Scenario 2.d. The purpose of these additional scenarios is to create data 
points for comparison to allow the estimation of the impact of EU policy on food 
security. In Scenario 1.b, China adopts GM wheat despite the widespread rejection of 
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the product which is plausible given that China is not an exporter of wheat. In Scenario 
1.d, the EU opposition induces opposition to GM wheat in only Maghreb countries 
(Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), Japan and South Korea. In Scenario 2.d, the EU 
acceptance will not induce acceptance in Japan and South Korea.  
In order to account for the possibility of no climate change and to evaluate the 
relative impact of climate change conditions, the EU non-GM/GM scenarios’ 1.a and 2.a 
were rerun under an assumption of no climate change. Scenario 1.c examines 
widespread opposition if climate change does not happen while Scenario 2.c involves 
widespread acceptance under similar climatic conditions (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 – Opposition scenarios 















        
Weather: Climate 
Change 
Yes Yes No  Yes Yes No Yes 
        
Potential Adopters:         
Adopt or Not        
Australia No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Argentina No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Canada No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
China No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
USA No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EU No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
        
Major Importers:         
Import or Not        
Maghreb No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Japan No No No No Yes Yes No 
South Korea No No No No Yes Yes No 
Others No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
It is important to note that “Yes” for a major adopter or a major importer in table 
5.1 indicates total acceptance by that country, and the country is given a maximum 
tolerance (value of 5). In contrast “No” by an importer indicates that GM wheat is 
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banned by that country and it is given a zero tolerance index. Saying “No” by an adopter 
means that GM wheat is not adopted, and that the tolerance to GM wheat is equal to 
zero. This tolerance scale (0-5) was introduced in the diffusion model (Chapter 4). 
In each scenario, the model developed in Chapter 4 is used to simulate how food 
security is affected by various consumer responses to GM wheat.  In each scenario 
estimation involved the following steps: 1) local tolerance was assumed depending on 
each scenario (equation 4.2); 2) the foreign tolerance index facing potential GM wheat 
adopters is calculated (equation 4.3); 3) the adoption rate in each of those countries is 
estimated (equation 4.4 to equation 4.9); 4) the global adoption rates of GM wheat are 
determined (equation 4.10); and 5) the global adoption rate is then combined with the 
market model to compute global food security. It is important to emphasize that the goal 
from these scenarios is not the prediction of prices in the next decades. The main goal is 
the estimation of the impact that opposition to GM wheat will have on the expected price 
levels and variability compared with what would otherwise prevail. 
The comparison between the scenarios is used to estimate the impacts of the EU 
policy on global adoption of GM wheat and on global food security (see Table 5.2).  
• Scenario 1.a compared to Scenario 1.b provides estimates of the impact of 
Chinese adoption despite the widespread opposition.  
• Scenario 1.a compared to Scenario 2.a provides estimates of the impact of 
EU policy when there is widespread induced opposition.  
• Scenario 1.d compared to Scenario 2.a estimates the impact of EU policy 
when there is limited induced opposition.  
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• Scenario 2.a compared to Scenario 2.d estimates the role of Japan and Korea 
policies on food security.  
• Scenario 1.c compared to Scenario 2.c estimates the impact of EU policy 
when there is widespread induced opposition under no climate change.  
• Scenario 2.c compared to Scenario 2.a estimates the effect of climate change. 
Table 5.2 – Summary of analysis provide by scenario comparisons 
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(Japan and South 
Korea Oppose, 
Climate change) 
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 Effect of climate 
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5.1.1. Local and foreign tolerance indices for the specified opposition scenarios 
The first step to compute the adoption rates of potential adopters is to determine 
the level of tolerance level (foreign tolerance index) facing those countries. Table 5.3 
reports the local and the index of foreign tolerance facing major wheat exporters and 
China in all selected scenarios. In full rejection scenarios (Scenario 1.a or Scenario 1.c) 
the EU not only refrains from adopting GM wheat, but the region also bans any wheat 
import from GM adopting countries. The EU strong opposition will induce widespread 
opposition to GM wheat by all importing countries. Due to this full rejection, all 
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importing countries will impose a ban on both GM wheat and non-GM wheat from GM 
wheat producing countries. This opposition means that all wheat exporters are faced by 
an index of foreign tolerance equal to zero. The widespread opposition causes major 
wheat exporters to not introduce GM wheat (zero local tolerance). In this case, GM 
wheat is adopted neither regionally nor globally. 
Table 5.3 – Local and foreign tolerance indices for the specified opposition scenarios 
   Argentina Australia Canada  China  EU USA 
Local Tolerance 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Scenario 1.a or 
Scenario 1.c 
Index of Foreign Tolerance* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Local Tolerance 0 0 0 5 0 0 
Scenario 1.b Index of Foreign Tolerance* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Local tolerance 5 5 5 5 0 5 
Scenario 1.d Index of foreign Tolerance* 3 3 2 0 1 2 
Local Tolerance 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Scenario 2.a or 
Scenario 2.c Index of Foreign Tolerance* 3 4 2 0 1 2 
Local Tolerance 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Scenario 2.d Index of Foreign Tolerance* 3 3 2 0 1 2 
Source: Author’s calculations. *the index of foreign tolerance is calculated using equation 4.12. The 
foreign tolerance indices are base on assumptions about local tolerance of different countries in different 
scenarios. 
 
In Scenario 1.b all importers but China ban the import of GM wheat. China 
adopts as well as imports GM wheat. Despite the fact that in this scenario China has 
maximum local tolerance, the calculated index of foreign tolerance facing major wheat 
exporters is still equal to zero (see table 5.3). The index of foreign tolerance facing 
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major wheat exporters can be rounded to zero. This indicates that China’s acceptance 
will not be enough to encourage major wheat exporters to introduce GM wheat, since all 
other importers would have zero tolerance to GM wheat. China is not a wheat exporter, 
and therefore the only factor driving the adoption decision in China is the local 
tolerance. 
In scenario 1.d, the EU still opposes GM wheat and neither adopts GM wheat nor 
imports wheat from GM adopting countries. But, unlike in Scenario 1.a, only the 
Maghreb countries, Japan, and South Korea follow the EU policy— all other countries 
become GM tolerant. Table 5.3 reports the index of local and foreign tolerance facing 
China and major wheat exporters in Scenario 1.d. Among wheat exporters, Australia has 
the highest foreign tolerance, and the EU has the lowest. This is because the EU exports 
a higher share of its wheat production to Magreb countries than Australia does (see 
Appendix C). Australia exports only about 12% of its production to potential rejecters. 
In full acceptance scenarios under climate change (Scenario 2.a) and no climate 
change (Scenario 2.c), the EU has maximum tolerance to GM wheat. This acceptance 
will lead to maximum tolerance by all countries in the world. In this case major wheat 
exporters and China will adopt GM wheat. The index of foreign tolerance is highest for 
Australia (see Table 5.3) due to a larger share of Australia’s wheat production is 
destined for export as compared to others. 
In Scenario 2.d, Japan and South Korea might sustain a ban on the import of 
wheat from GM adopting countries regardless of the EU policy. If this were to occur, 
among the major exporters, Australia and Argentina would have the highest index of 
foreign tolerance (Table 5.3). This can be explained by the fact that both Australia and 
Argentina export a larger share of their production to GM tolerant countries, and a 
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smaller share of its production to Japan and South Korea (see Appendix C). The EU has 
the smallest index of foreign tolerance (after China), due to its small export to 
production share. Despite this opposition, the otherwise relatively high foreign tolerance 
to GM wheat would act as a driver for the adoption of GM wheat by major wheat 
exporters. 
5.1.2. GM wheat adoption rates under the specified opposition scenarios 
The tolerance levels calculated above are used to compute the adoption rates of 
potential adopters in each scenario (see Table 5.4) using the model described in chapter 
4. In the full rejection scenarios (Scenario 1.a or Scenario 1.c) GM wheat is not adopted 
by any country. In scenario 1.b, China will start adopting GM wheat in 2007. The level 
of adoption of GM wheat in China will increase to reach the level of 30% in 2030. Since 
China is the only adopter, the global adoption of GM wheat is forecast to be low, not 
exceeding the 4% level (Table 5.4). 
In the limited rejection scenario (scenario 1.d), despite the opposition to GM 
wheat, major wheat-exporters (except the EU) will adopt GM wheat.  Canada and the 
USA are the early adopters. In 2030, the adoption rate is 70% in the USA, and over that 
in Argentina, Australia, and Canada. In this scenario, the global adoption rate will reach 
over 20% in 2030. In scenario 2.a and scenario 2.c, Canada and the USA are the first 
adopters of this new technology starting in 2005. Other exporters follow in 2006, and 
China in 2007. Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the USA have very high adoption 
rates, exceeding 70% in 2030. The EU however has an adoption rate lower that 50% in 
2030. In all scenarios, it is assumed that GM wheat will be adopted mainly by major 
wheat exporters and China, therefore the rest of the world adoption rates is kept at zero. 
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In these scenarios, the global adoption rate increases from 3% in 2005 to reach 25% in 
2030 (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4 – GM wheat adoption rates in major exporters, China and the World 
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71% 73% 73% 30%* 48% 72% 25% 
*The adoption rate in China is small because it is mainly driven by local tolerance, which was assigned a 
less coefficient index in the diffusion model than that for the foreign tolerance. For more detailed regional 
and global adoption results please see Appendix D.  
Source: Author calculations 
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In scenario 2.d, Canada would have the highest adoption rate during the whole 
period, reaching an adoption rate of 73% in 2030. Australia would attain the same level 
in 2030. Along with Australia and Canada, Argentina and the USA also have relatively 
high adoption rates, exceeding 70% in 2030. The EU however has an adoption rate 
around 48% in 2030. In this scenario, the global adoption rate will increase rapidly from 
only 3% in 2005 to 25% in 2030 (Table 5.4). 
5.1.3. Food security elements under the specified opposition scenarios 
The global adoption rates calculated above for each scenario are integrated in the 
market model in order to compute food security elements. The results are presented in 
Table 5.5. Before explaining these results, it is important to check first whether the 
simulation results are consistent with past trends. This check is done for scenario 1.a by 
comparing expected prices from this scenario with past trends of prices. Historical prices 
from 1980 to 2000 (not simulated) are plotted in the same figure as the simulated 
average, minimum and maximum expected price from 100 runs in Scenario 1.a from 
2000 to 2030 (see Figure 5.1). Since 1980, there have been three price spikes –in 1980, 
1988, and 1995. The price spikes were short lived, and the long-term decline in real 
wheat prices continued. The result of the simulation is consistent with this trend. It is 
expected that the long-term decline in real wheat prices will continue with the 
probability of some price spikes occurring during the simulation horizon. Figure 5.1 also 







Figure 5.1 – Average, minimum, and maximum expected prices 1980-2030 
 
In Table 5.5, the results of scenario 1.a along with the results of other scenarios 
are presented in more details. By not adopting GM wheat (Scenario 1.a or Scenario 1.c), 
the world will not take advantage of the productivity gain that GM wheat may offer. 
Therefore, in these two scenarios, conventional varieties are the only production 
technology that could be used. The effect of conventional technology on future prices 
will be influenced by whether climate change will occur or not (Scenario 1.a or Scenario 
1.c). In scenario 1.a, conventional wheat varieties will permit the increase of wheat 
availability by 7% from 2000 to 2030. This increase in availability will lead to a decline 
in expected world wheat prices by 34% from 2000 to 2030. The decline in prices will 
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model to increase by 19% from 2000 to 2030. Therefore, global food security is 
predicted by the model to improve from year 2000 to 2030 (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 – Change in availability, expected price, consumption, ending stock, and probability of 
high prices between 2000 and 2030. 





Scenario 1.a  7% -34% 5% 19%  
Scenario 1.c 8% -37% 6% 19%  
Scenario 1.b 8% - 36% 5% 20%  
Scenario 1.d 9% - 42% 6% 23%  
Scenario 2.a  9% - 44% 7% 24%  
Scenario 2.c 10% - 46% 7% 26%  
Scenario 2.d 9% - 43% 7% 24%  
Source: Authors’ calculation from simulation results. For more detailed results see Appendix E. 
In Scenario 1.c, GM wheat is fully rejected, but climate change does not occur. 
Expected prices, and ending stocks are characterized with the same trend as in Scenario 
1.a. Conventional technology will increase the availability of wheat by 8% from 2000 to 
2030. As a result, expected prices are predicted to decline by 37% from 2000 to 2030. 
Consumption will increase by around 6% in the same period. The stock of wheat will 
increase by 19% from 2000 to 2030. Therefore the global food security situation is 
expected to improve in the coming decades (Table 5.5).  
In scenario 1.b, GM wheat in combination with the conventional varieties, will 
increase the global availability of wheat by 8%. It is estimated that this increase in 
availability will lead expected wheat prices to decline by 36% from 2000 to 2030. The 
consumption is expected to increase by 5% from 2000 to 2030. The ending stock is 
projected to increase by 20% from 2000 to 2030 (Table 5.5). 
In scenario 1.d (limited opposition and climate change), the adoption of GM 
wheat (along with conventional varieties) will increase availability of wheat by 9% 
between 2000 and 2030. This increase in availability will cause a decline in expected 
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world wheat prices by 42% from 2000 to 2030. Consumption of wheat will increase by 
6% as a result of the expected price decline. The ending stock is expected to increase by 
23% from 2000 to 2030 (Table 5.5).  
If GM wheat is fully accepted and climate change occurs (Scenario 2.a) wheat 
availability will go up by 9% from 2000 to 2030. This increase in availability will drive 
expected wheat prices down by 44% from 2000 to 2030. Consumption goes up by 7% 
due to the expected price decline (Table 5.5).  
If GM wheat is fully accepted but climate change does not occur (2.c), the 
adoption of GM wheat will increase wheat availability by 10%. As a result of the 
increase in availability, the expected wheat price would decline by 46% between 2000 
and 2030. Consumption is predicted to rise by 7% as a response to the expected price 
decline and the ending stock is projected to decline by 26 % between 2000 and 2030 
(Table 5.5).  
In scenario 1.d, the relatively high adoption rate despite the opposition would 
increase availability by 9% from 2000 to 2030, which would lead to an expected price 
decline of 43%. This expected price decline would increase consumption by 7%. The 
ending stock would be expected to increase by 24% from 2000 to 2030. The adoption of 
GM wheat would contribute to stabilizing expected prices despite the opposition of 
Japan and South Korea (Table 5.5). 
In all scenarios, future prices are expected to continue to vary between 2000-
2005 and 2025-2030 periods (see Table E.5). The probability of high prices will 
continue to be high exceeding 14% in all periods and exceeding 18% in 2010-2015 and 
2020-2025 (Table E.4). 
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In conclusion, the results of the simulations suggest that: 
• Whether climate change occurs or not over the next three decades, the 
food situation will continue to improve. The long-term decline in real 
wheat prices will continue, with the probability of some price spikes 
occurring. The conventional technology will be able to expand the wheat 
availability to cover the increasing consumption in the coming decades 
and will permit some increase availability of food. This improvement will 
lead the expected prices of wheat to fall from their level in 2000. This 
decline of expected prices between 2000 and 2030 will induce higher 
consumption. 
• Even with climate change the adoption of GM wheat by only China is 
expected to help improve the global food security situation in the coming 
decades. 
•  Despite some expected rejection of GM wheat, the adoption of GM 
wheat will be relatively high. This will allow the global food security 
situation to improve further, with increased food availability and reduced 
expected prices. 
•  Regardless of whether climate change happens, the adoption of GM 
wheat by major wheat exporters and China would enable expected prices 
to decline significantly by increasing the availability of food, which 
would ease food insecurity problems, especially for the poor who are the 
most sensitive to prices. 
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5.2. Effect of opposition on GM wheat adoption 
The scenarios can be compared to derive estimates of the impacts of the EU 
policy on regional as well as global adoption of GM wheat and on global food security 
(Table 5.6).  
Widespread opposition (with or without climate change) would greatly affect 
adoption rates of GM wheat in major wheat exporters. At the country level, the adoption 
reaction to this opposition is above 70% in 2030 for Canada, the USA, Argentina and 
Australia. However, the adoption reaction is around 48% for the EU. This is because 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, and USA export a larger share of their wheat production, 
and therefore GM wheat adoption is more limited by foreign opposition. The adoption 
reaction to widespread opposition is particularly small for China (30% in 2030). This is 
because almost none of the production is sold in foreign markets; therefore only the 
local opposition influences the adoption reaction there. 
Widespread induced opposition would cause the global adoption rate to be lower 
(comparing scenarios 1.a and 2.a).  The results (Table 5.6, column 1 and column 2) 
suggest that if the EU induces widespread opposition (whether climate change occurs or 
not), there will be a decline in the GM adoption rate by as much as 25% by 2030. It is 
important to mention that the underlying assumption in the adoption model—that only 
the major wheat exporters and China are likely to adopt GM wheat in any 
circumstances—may under-estimate the effect of widespread opposition on global 
adoption. The effect of widespread opposition varies depending on whether climate 
change occurs. If climate change occurs, widespread opposition would deprive the world 
of a range of potentially more productive varieties (GM wheat). Therefore, overall 
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potential availability declines by as much as 1.8%, causing the world price for wheat to 
be more than 16% higher in 2030 than it otherwise might be. The increased expected 
world prices would cause consumption to decline by about 1.3% in 2030. Widespread 
opposition would negatively affect the ending stock, by up to 4% in 2030 (Table 5.6). It 
is important to mention that consumption of wheat in poor countries is more sensitive to 
expected price changes, and therefore it is expected that most of the consumption 
decline due to expected price increase would be in poor countries.  
If climate change does not occur and there is widespread opposition (comparing 
scenarios 1.b and 2.b, column 2, table 5.6), the results are slightly different. Widespread 
opposition would lower availability by 2%, leading to an expected price rise of 17% in 
2030. This increase in expected price would reduce consumption by 1.2% in the year 
2030. As a result of this expected price increase, the ending stock would shrink by 
around 5% in 2030. The probability of high expected prices is not predicted to increase 
in 2025-2030 because of widespread opposition, whether climate change occurs or not 
(Table E.5). However the variability of prices seems to increase beyond 2010 especially 
under the climate change assumption (see Table E.5). 
 If the EU induces limited opposition (comparing scenarios 1.d and 2.a, column 
3, Table 5.6), the adoption response of potential adopters is small in the case of 
Argentina, Australia, Canada and the USA because only a very small share of their 
wheat production is sold to those markets (see Appendix C). Due to the limited 
opposition induced by the EU, potential GM adopters slightly decrease their GM wheat 
adoption by 1% to 5%. The adoption response to this opposition is zero for China (China 
adopts GM wheat), since that market is independent of export market. In contrast, if the 
EU itself opposes GM wheat, there would be significant losses of potential adoption 
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equal to 48% in the EU in 2030. The global reaction to the limited opposition is only 5% 
in 2030. The decline in global adoption due to limited rejection would decrease wheat 
availability by not more than 0.3%. This decline in availability, although small, would 
lead expected prices to be 3% higher than otherwise in 2030. The expected price 
increase would decrease consumption by only 0.2% (Table 5.6). Limited opposition is 
not expected to change the probability of high expected prices (Table E.5), nor the 
variability of future prices by much (Table E.5). 






















Effect of  
Climate 
Change 
 Adoption Rates 
World - 25% - 25% - 5% -1% +4% 0% 
Argentina -71% -71% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Australia -78% -78% -5% -5% 0% 0% 
Canada -77% -77% -5% -3% 0% 0% 
China -30% -30% 0% 0% +30% 0% 
EU -48% -48% -48% 0% 0% 0% 
USA -75% -75% -5% -3% 0% 0% 
       
 Food Security Elements 
Expect Price +16.33% +17.01% +2.94% +0.46% -2.30% +4.96% 
Availability -1.81% -2.02% -0.32% -0.05% 0.30% -0.52% 
Consumption -1.29% -1.28% -0.23% -0.04% 0.21% -0.37% 
Ending Stock -4.10% -5.32% -0.74% -0.12% 0.70% -1.17% 
Source: Author’s calculation from the food security model simulations. See Appendix D and E for more 
detailed results. 
 
In contrast to the above results if Japan and South Korea oppose the technology 
(comparing scenarios 2.a and 2.d, column 4, Table 5.6), there will only be a small effect 
on regional as well as global adoption. Chinese adoption of GM wheat is independent of 
whether or not Japan and South Korea ban GM wheat, because as mentioned before, 
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China is not a wheat exporter. The decision of China to adopt GM wheat is completely 
determined by local policy. Neither the EU’s nor Argentian adoption of GM wheat are 
affected by Japan and South Korea opposition because they export less that 0.2% of their 
production to South Korea, and do not export to Japan. Australia is the most affected by 
this opposition, since over 11% of its production goes to Japan and South Korea. The 
response of Australia to Japan and South Korea opposition would be to lower Australia’s 
GM wheat adoption by 5% in 2030.  Canada and the USA will equally respond to the 
opposition to GM wheat by a decline in their adoption rates by 3% in 2030. Japanese 
and South Korean opposition equally affects Canada and the USA, since both countries 
export approximately 8% of their production to these countries. The slight adoption 
response to Japan and South Korea opposition in Australia, Canada and the USA means 
that Japan and South Korea opposition is not an essential factor in the global adoption of 
GM wheat. As seen in Table 5.6, the adoption response to this opposition is a decline of 
global adoption of only 1%.  If only Japan and South Korea oppose GM wheat, there 
would only be a very small influence on the availability of wheat. The greatest impact 
this opposition might have would be to decrease the availability by 0.1% in 2030. As a 
result, the effect of Japan and South Korea opposition on expected prices does not 
exceed 0.5%. This is expected to have only a very small effect on the future 
consumption. This opposition has no effect on the probability of high expected prices 
(Table E.5) nor on the price variability in the future (Table E.6). 
There is a real possibility that China might adopt GM wheat, regardless of what 
others do.  If China adopts GM wheat (comparing scenario 1.a and 1.b, column 5, Table 
5.6), its adoption rate could reach 30% by the year 2030. The adoption of GM wheat by 
China would not likely induce adoption by major wheat exporters. Argentina and the EU 
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export less than 1% of their production to China, which is too little to motivate these two 
countries to adopt GM wheat. Meanwhile, Australia and the USA export over 4% of 
their production to China, whereas Canada exports about 10% of its production to China. 
Overall, this share of production is small, and the risk of losing other markets would 
discourage most of these exporters from adopting GM wheat. China’s adoption of GM 
wheat would alone lead to global adoption equal to 4% by 2030. This would lead to an 
increase in global wheat availability, thereby lowering expected prices by 2.3% in 2030. 
The expected price decline would lead to consumption increasing by 0.2% in 2030. The 
ending stock would increase by 0.7% in 2030 (Table 5.6). China’s adoption would have 
no obvious effect on the volatility of expected prices (Table E.6), or on the probability of 
high expected prices (Table E.5). Therefore, the simulation results indicate that China’s 
decision about GM wheat will have a more significant impact on global food security 
than either the impact of the Magreb countries or Japan and South Korea. 
In the diffusion model, climate change was not included as a driving factor—
climate change is assumed to neither motivate nor discourage countries to adopt GM 
wheat. However, climate change is expected to affect availability, expected price, 
consumption, and ending stocks by affecting the variation of yields (comparing 
scenarios 2.a and 2.c, column 6, Table 5.6). Climate change by itself will decrease the 
availability of wheat by as much as 0.5% in 2030 and could raise prices by 5% from 
status quo prices. The consumption reaction to this expected price increase would be a 
decrease of 0.37%, and the ending stocks would decline by more than 1%. Perhaps most 
importantly, climate change is expected to significantly increase the variability of prices 
in the coming decades, which would particularly imperil poor consumers in developing 
countries (Table E.6). 
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The price changes due to the opposition to GM wheat will affect the number of 
undernourished people in developing countries by affecting their ability to acquire 
adequate amount of food.  Estimations of number of undernourished people are 
represented in the last row of Table 5.7. It is assumed here that only wheat will be 
affected by this opposition to GM food. The increase in wheat prices due to the 
opposition to GM wheat will lead to a decline of wheat consumption in developing 
countries. It is estimated by FAO (2002b) that wheat demand will present 40.35% of 
cereal demand in 2030 and that cereal will contribute to 43.41% of the total 
consumption. Therefore, wheat will contribute by 17.52% to total food consumption or 
average food intake in developing countries. The Sixth World Food Survey released by 
the FAO estimates that by 2030, 6% of the population in developing countries will be 
food insecure (FAO, 1996). This estimate was obtained by specifying that in 2030 the 
average food intake (average food consumption) is equal to 2980 kcal/person/day, and 
that the threshold below each a person is considered undernourished is equal to 1882 
kcal/person/day. The change in wheat prices will lead to a change in food consumption 
(or average food intake) and the percentage of undernourishment, and therefore the 




                                                 
30 If for example the change in price is 16.33% (widespread opposition with climate change), wheat consumption 
will change by -4.08%, and total food consumption or average intake will change by -4.08%*17.52%=-0.72%, which 
mean that the new average is equal to 2980 *(1-0.72%) = 2959 kcal/person/day. The new average intake and the 
threshold of 1882 are used to calculate the percentage and number of undernourished people in 2030 as a result of the 




Table 5.7 – Effect of opposition to GM wheat on the incidence of undernourishment in developing 






















Effect of  
Climate 
Change 
Expected Price +16.33% +17.01% +2.94% +0.46% -2.30% +4.96% 
Wheat 
Consumption 
-4.08% -4.25% -0.74% -0.12% 0.56% -1.24% 
Food 
Consumption 
-0.72% -0.74% -0.13% -0.02% 0.1% -0.22% 
Percentage of 
Undernourished 




23 24 4 1 -3 7 
* The demand elasticity of wheat for developing countries is assumed to be equal 0.25, which is the price 
elasticity of demand for the rest of the world reported by Sullivan et al (1989). 
Source: Author’s calculation from simulation results and data from FAO (1996) and FAO (2002b). 
 
Widespread opposition to GM wheat will deprive 23 to 24 million people from a 
chance to escape food insecurity depending of whether climate change occurs or not. If 
climate change occurs without GM opposition it will expose 7 million people to the risk 
of hunger by the year 2030. The number of people that may be exposed to the risk of 
hunger due to limited opposition and Japan and South Korean opposition are 4 million 
and 1 million respectively in the year 2030. If China adopts GM wheat it will offer 
enough food to 3 million people by 2030.  
 
5.3. Conclusion 
Whether the opposition to GM wheat production and consumption will ease or 
increase in the coming decades will have a major effect on what this technology can 
offer in term of food security, through higher and more stable yields in the future. The 
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opposition to GM food in some regions, especially the EU, will affect the worldwide 
diffusion of GM wheat. This loss in adoption would translate into losses in terms of 
potential productivity increases that GM wheat may offer.  
It is noteworthy that the world may lose in terms of food security due to the 
opposition to GM wheat. However, these losses are related directly to the degree of this 
opposition to GM wheat, and whether climate change will occur or not. In summary the 
simulation results indicated that: 
• If the EU induces a widespread opposition (whether climate change   
occurs or not), potential GM adopters are likely to react by not adopting 
GM wheat. This will deprive the world of the additional productivity that 
GM wheat might offer in the future leading to a decline in wheat 
availability and a significant increase in future prices. The rise of 
expected prices would translate into a decline in consumption. 
Malnourished people are spending a very large proportion of their income 
on food, and it is expected that this consumption decline would occur for 
them since they are more sensitive to expected price changes. The 
widespread opposition to GM wheat will deprive around 24 million 
people from a chance to escape hunger and starvation in 2030. 
•  If the EU induces opposition in only few countries (e.g., Tunisia, 
Algeria, Morocco, Japan, and South Korea), the diffusion of GM wheat 
will not be affected significantly. Therefore this degree of opposition will 
have only a very small effect on availability, expected price, consumption 
and ending stocks. This opposition will mean the continuation of 
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undernourishment for 4 million people in developing countries by the 
year 2030. 
•  If China adopts GM wheat in spite of widespread rejection by all other 
countries, global availability would increase, leading to lower expected 
prices, and higher consumption. It is important to note that the effect of 
China’s adoption has a similar magnitude (although has the opposite 
sign) to the limited opposition scenario. China’s adoption to GM wheat 
could save 3 million people from the risk of undernourishment in 2030.  
•  The opposition of Japan and South Korea will not affect future 
consumption, since its effect on adoption rates, and therefore availability 
and expected prices, is minimal. An additional one million people will 
continue to live under the risk of hunger because of this opposition. 
•  Climate change would decrease the availability of wheat, leading to 
higher expected prices, and lower consumption. Climate change would 
also increase the volatility of expected prices, by increasing the 
probability of high expected prices. Climate change will cause the 












CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSIONS 
6.0. Summary of conclusions 
Modern agricultural biotechnology, which has enabled the development as such 
products as GM wheat, has the potential to ease the food security problem that is facing 
the world. GM wheat has the potential to increase yield growth significantly, helping to 
produce more food to meet the increasing needs of the world population. If widely 
adopted, GM wheat could improve global food security by decreasing the world wheat 
price and therefore make wheat more accessible to poor and import-dependent countries. 
The opposition to biotechnology in general, and to GM crops specifically, may be a 
major constraint to the adoption of GM wheat and its diffusion worldwide, thereby 
affecting the global food security. The global adoption of GM wheat and therefore 
global food security depends on the degree of worldwide resistance that the EU’s 
opposition may induce.  
The main goal of this thesis was to estimate the impact of EU opposition to GM 
wheat on global food security. To do so, a global food security model was developed by 
 107
combining a market model with a GM adoption model. This model was then adapted to 
food production shocks such as climate change. A number of scenarios were analyzed to 
consider the range of potential effects of the EU opposition to GM wheat on global food 
security. 
The most important finding of this study is that opposition to GM wheat might 
deprive the world from a potential tool to improve global food security and reducing the 
number of undernourished people in developing countries. The magnitudes of these 
losses are directly related to the degree of opposition to GM wheat. If the EU induces 
widespread opposition (whether climate change occurs or not) this will greatly diminish 
global food security since it deprives the world of the benefits that GM wheat may offer. 
Widespread opposition to GM wheat would lead to a global decline in the adoption of 
this technology, which varies, from 3% in 2005 to 25% in 2030. This would reduce the 
availability, leading to a 16% increase in expected prices by 2030. The price increase 
leads to a decline in consumption, and ending stocks.  The price increase will deprive 23 
to 24 million of people from accessing enough food exposing them to the risk of hunger.  
However, if the EU induces only limited opposition by affecting the position of 
only a few countries, such as the Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco) or 
Japan and South Korea, this will not have a significant effect on global food security. 
The limited opposition to GM wheat would lead to a small global adoption reaction, 
varying from 1% in 2007 to 5% in 2030. Therefore, this degree of opposition will have a 
very small effect on availability, price, as well as consumption and ending stocks. 
However, even these small changes in prices could expose 4 million people in 
developing countries to the risk of hunger.  
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 It is interesting to note that global food security was improved if China adopted 
GM wheat which would almost offset the effect of limited opposition elsewhere. Driven 
by its local policy only, China’s adoption could rise to 30% by 2030, which would 
depress wheat prices by approximately 3% in 2030. This price decline will save 3 
million people from hunger. 
An import ban on GM wheat in Japan and Korea would reduce global adoption 
by only 1%, since the adoption reaction of wheat exporting countries would be very 
small. The effect on price and availability is therefore minimal, and future consumption 
is not expected to be affected by this degree of opposition. However, 1 million people in 
developing countries will be undernourished because of this price increase. One million 
might be small numerically, but it can not be ignored since we are dealing with human 
lives. 
It is important to note that if climate change occurs, lower availability of wheat 
would lead to higher prices. Climate change would also greatly increase the volatility of 
prices. Climate change is expected to increase the probability of high prices escalating 
the risk of food insecurity. 
The results of this research are important in terms of future policy and 
regulations regarding release as well as trade of GM products. Many countries still 
oppose GM crops. GM exporting countries should not ignore those concerns. We have 
learned from recent BSE and bird influenza outbreaks that consumer perception of 
safety of a given product can fundamentally alter the trade of those products. It is 
obvious that consumer concern can be the main driver as well as the main obstacle to 
adoption. Regardless of the reasons or concerns behind this resistance, those concerns 
should be taken into account in the development and evaluation of new products before 
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their release and commercial development. Opposing (consumers) countries should 
similarly recognize that their opposition might deprive the world of more food.  
Consumer concern over GM food is an issue that needs attention, whether this 
opposition is based on science or not. It is urgent that opponents and proponents of GM 
food arrive at a midpoint that satisfies both parties. The failure to do so will deprive the 
world of a technology that may help to feed the hungry. It is understandable that 
interests of different parties over the issue of GM food may conflict. However, all 
parties should consider food security as an important component in the international 
trade negotiations over GM food.  
To help ease the opposition to biotechnology and to GM food products more 
specifically, it is recommended that biotech corporations should deliver GM crops with 
clear benefits for consumers and farmers. They should also be more open about the GM 
products they export, so consumers can enjoy the benefits of the technology while 
avoiding possible risks. 
Perceptions about GM foods among exporters on one side, and the EU and 
developing countries on the other, are different. Exporters of GM food should realize 
that the perception that they are imposing GM food on consumers might only lead to 
stronger opposition. The EU should realize that its stance on GM food might induce a 
widespread rejection to GM food and thereby worsening global food insecurity. 
Continuing international negotiation appears to be an important component of a 
resolution to this dilemma. 
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6.1. Study limitations 
The empirical model used in this research has several important limitations. The 
first limitation is related to the global aggregation of the model. This aggregation does 
not account for regional heterogeneity in population growth, in yield growth, in climate 
effects, and in the magnitude of climate change. Although this was necessary since the 
goal was to estimate food security at the global level and not at the regional level, those 
factors were central to the generation of estimates of regional food insecurity. In 
addition, aggregation of food security measures may underestimate the effect of 
opposition to GM wheat, since small change in global responses may mask extremely 
significant regional effects.  
The second limitation concerns the use of only one commodity (wheat). By using 
only one commodity, the analysis does not allow for substitution in consumption as well 
as in production. On the production side, declining world wheat prices might cause 
farmers to switch to crops that are more profitable. On the consumption side, rising 
wheat prices may cause consumers to substitute it with cheaper imported or local food. 
The third limitation is related to the difficulty of asserting consumer opposition. 
In modeling adoption, consumer opposition/tolerance indexes were assigned to each 
country based on their labeling threshold levels. Values assigned in this research varied 
from zero for countries with a 0% threshold to five for country having voluntary or no 
labeling laws. This method was used due to the limitation of information on consumer 
preferences. 
The fourth limitation is in the opposition scenarios. In opposition scenarios 
countries are faced with the decision to fully accept (maximum tolerance equal to five) 
 111
or fully reject (zero tolerance) GM wheat. This situation means that importers chose 
between two extremes: they can ban imports from GM wheat adopting countries, or 
accept all trade without any constraints on GM wheat. This reflects an implicit 
assumption that GM free and GM tolerant markets can not coexist. This also implicitly 
assumes that there is no cheap form of segregation. In this model, while it is possible to 
introduce a wider range of opposition scenarios allowing for this coexistence, that would 
complicate the analysis.  
6.2. Recommendations for further research 
This research serves as an attempt to evaluate the effect of EU opposition to GM 
wheat on global food security. Both the diffusion model and global food security model 
developed in this thesis have the potential to be applied to a wide range of research 
problems that focus on GM crops regionally or worldwide. The diffusion model can be 
extended to better understand how opposition to GM food has affected the adoption 
processes of any GM crop. This may be realized by applying the diffusion model to 
several GM crops (regionally and globally). The global food security model developed 
here can be further extended for related studies that focus on the regional and global 
effect of EU opposition to GM food. The following are a few examples of possible 
further research. 
1) The food security model can be extended to include more 
commodities (e.g., rice and corn) and more countries. Including more 
commodities besides wheat would permit the interaction between different 
commodity markets. Including different countries allows for technological 
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and economical differences between regions and the computation of food 
security at the regional level.  
2) A second model extension would be to estimate changes in 
producer and consumer surpluses due to the opposition of EU to GM wheat. 
This research would estimate the forgone benefits to consumers and 
producers caused by the possible worldwide opposition to GM wheat. 
3) One possible extension of the diffusion model would be to 
analyze how different institutions and biotechnology companies respond to 
the opposition to GM food. Do they recognize that this opposition can affect 
the future path of biotechnology itself or do they think it is a temporary 
obstacle that will disappear with time? If there are some responses, are they 
effective or not? Many GM crops can be used as case studies to answer the 
above questions. The canola case in Canada is a good example, where 
consumer opposition in the EU led to an almost total loss of the European 
export market.   
4) A second extension of the diffusion model could be to identify 
other reasons (political, cultural, religious, and development issues) that may 
explain the response of specific governments and consumers to GM food. 
Evaluating the responses of Muslim governments, consumers and producers 
would be one interesting case to study. Many questions remain unanswered 
about how the Muslim world will respond to biotechnology. Little is known 
about what agricultural biotechnology might offer to the Muslim world. 
Understanding Muslim opinions toward GM food and biotechnology itself is 
a great challenge, but could have great benefits as well. 
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5)  Another possible extension is to analyze the transmission of 
consumer concerns (local and foreign) about GM food to production and 
policy decision makers in developing countries. Zambia’s rejection of GM 
food-aid could be used as a case study. This research would allow us to 
understand the transmission methods related to technologies that are not 
universally accepted or rejected (such as biotechnology). By studying the 
case of Zambia we might be able to understand how such government policy 
is taken? What are the drivers of such policy? Who makes decisions? What 
institutions or structures do they use? Why was the decision made and how 
did government policy affect producers’ and consumers’ attitudes (if at all) 
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APPENDIX A –WHEAT DATA 
Table A.1 – Sources of calories consumed, 1961 and 1997 
Rank 1961 1997 
  (Percentage)   (Percentage) 
Developing Countries       
1 Rice 28.1 Rice 27.3 
2 Wheat 12 Wheat 18.8 
Total Calories 
1932   2650 
Developed Countries       
1 Wheat 26.7 Wheat 23.5 
Total Calories 2948   3240 
World       
1 Rice 18.2 Rice 21.1 
2 Wheat 18.1 Wheat 20.1 
Total Calories 2257   2782 






























Table A.2 – World production, consumption, trade and ending stocks, 1960-2000 (in million tonnes) 
Year Production Consumption Trade  Ending stocks 
1960/61 233.5 228.6 41.5 82.8 
1961/62 220.0 232.2 46.8 69.9 
1962/63 246.8 237.7 43.9 75.8 
1963/64 230.4 234.3 55.1 70.3 
1964/65 264.9 251.0 51.4 78.5 
1965/66 259.3 276.1 61.7 60.7 
1966/67 300.7 273.0 56.8 87.6 
1967/68 291.9 280.6 53.0 97.7 
1968/69 323.8 298.4 47.8 121.3 
1969/70 304.0 317.4 52.6 103.5 
1970/71 306.5 328.9 55.1 80.5 
1971/72 344.1 335.7 56.6 89.2 
1972/73 337.5 352.6 65.4 74.9 
1973/74 366.1 351.6 60.1 82.7 
1974/75 355.2 353.3 59.8 81.4 
1975/76 352.6 346.8 64.9 86.7 
1976/77 414.3 369.5 58.5 127.4 
1977/78 377.8 399.0 70.5 109.2 
1978/79 438.9 405.2 68.0 134.8 
1979/80 417.5 428.6 83.1 120.5 
1980/81 435.9 443.5 89.6 112.7 
1981/82 445.1 441.8 97.2 112.5 
1982/83 472.8 447.9 93.7 129.9 
1983/84 484.4 465.2 97.5 145.3 
1984/85 509.0 484.2 102.4 168.0 
1985/86 494.9 482.6 80.6 178.3 
1986/87 524.1 508.6 86.7 191.1 
1987/88 496.0 531.0 113.6 156.7 
1988/89 495.0 515.9 101.8 133.1 
1989/90 533.2 526.4 98.3 135.2 
1990/91 588.1 547.9 97.8 170.5 
1991/92 542.9 549.9 109.6 162.0 
1992/93 561.7 547.0 109.1 175.7 
1993/94 558.1 548.1 99.2 180.5 
1994/95 523.8 545.6 99.3 160.2 
1995/96 538.1 543.2 96.5 153.3 
1996/97 581.9 565.5 100.6 164.7 
1997/98 610.1 578.7 101.7 195.4 
1998/99 589.7 577.7 99.6 206.1 
1999/00 586.1 581.6 109.8 207.0 














Table A.3 – Wheat yield data in hg/ha 
  World Developed Countries Developing Countries 
1961 10,889 12,687 7,754 
1962 12,060 13,755 8,970 
1963 11,320 12,479 9,301 
1964 12,413 14,103 9,419 
1965 12,151 13,349 9,986 
1966 14,079 16,390 9,793 
1967 13,392 15,022 10,430 
1968 14,532 16,661 10,809 
1969 14,170 16,106 11,041 
1970 14,939 17,445 11,237 
1971 16,245 18,983 12,139 
1972 16,048 18,439 12,751 
1973 16,837 19,860 12,240 
1974 16,154 18,441 12,755 
1975 15,700 16,868 13,960 
1976 17,910 19,911 15,069 
1977 16,718 18,848 13,575 
1978 19,328 22,091 15,392 
1979 18,521 19,957 16,565 
1980 18,554 20,538 15,653 
1981 18,800 20,144 16,774 
1982 19,991 20,991 18,532 
1983 21,258 22,402 19,736 
1984 22,200 23,164 20,891 
1985 21,718 22,574 20,593 
1986 23,207 24,176 21,960 
1987 22,899 24,236 21,265 
1988 22,921 23,748 21,900 
1989 23,734 24,941 22,239 
1990 25,616 27,782 22,893 
1991 24,488 25,450 23,374 
1992 25,410 26,325 24,314 
1993 25,318 26,014 24,515 
1994 24,513 24,680 24,329 
1995 25,082 24,955 25,227 
1996 25,761 25,759 25,764 
1997 27,106 26,661 27,632 
1998 26,932 27,585 26,233 
1999 27,562 28,121 26,965 
2000 27,150 27,220 27,070 
2001 27,584 28,297 26,751 
2002 26,952 27,340 26,506 
Source: FAO database (FAO 2000) 
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APPENDIX B – THE CORN DIFFUSION MODEL DATA 
Table B.1 – Local tolerance (case of corn) 
Country (tolerance level) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Argentina 5 5 5 5 5 
Australia 5 5 5 5 4 
Austria 5 1 1 1 1 
Bel-lux 5 1 1 1 1 
Brazil 5 5 5 5 0 
Bulgaria 5 1 1 1 1 
Canada 5 5 5 5 5 
China 5 5 5 5 4 
Czech Republic 5 5 0 0 0 
Denmark 5 1 1 1 1 
Finland 5 1 1 1 1 
France 5 1 1 1 1 
Germany 5 1 1 1 1 
Greece 5 1 1 1 1 
Hungary 5 5 5 4 4 
India 5 5 5 5 5 
Ireland 5 1 1 1 1 
Israel 5 5 5 5 1 
Italy 5 1 1 1 1 
Japan 5 5 5 5 3 
Korea republic of 5 5 5 5 4 
Liechtenstein 5 5 5 5 5 
Luxembourg 5 1 1 1 1 
Mexico 5 5 5 5 5 
Netherlands 5 1 1 1 1 
New Zealand 5 5 5 5 1 
Norway 5 5 5 2 2 
Poland 5 5 5 5 5 
Portugal 5 1 1 1 1 
Romania 5 5 5 5 1 
Russian Federation  5 5 4 4 4 
Slovakia  5 5 5 5 5 
South Africa 5 5 5 5 4 
Spain 5 1 1 1 1 
Sweden 5 1 1 1 1 
Switzerland 5 1 1 1 1 
Turkey 5 5 5 5 5 
United Kingdom 5 1 1 1 1 
United States  5 5 5 5 5 
Others 5 5 5 5 5 




Table B.2 – Foreign tolerance (case of corn) 
Country (tolerance level) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Argentina  5 3 2 3 3 
Australia  0 0 0 1 1 
Brazil  0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria  0 0 0 1 1 
Canada  0 0 0 0 0 
China  0 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic  0 1 0 1 0 
EU 5 1 1 1 1 
Hungary  0 1 1 1 1 
India  0 0 0 0 0 
Israel  0 0 0 0 0 
Japan  0 0 0 0 0 
Korea republic of 0 0 0 0 0 
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico  0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand  0 0 0 0 0 
Norway  0 0 0 0 0 
Poland  0 0 0 0 0 
Romania  0 0 0 0 0 
Russian Federation  0 0 0 0 0 
Slovakia  0 2 1 1 0 
South Africa  0 1 1 0 0 
Turkey  0 0 0 0 0 
United States  1 1 1 1 1 















Table B.3 – Pooled data for the diffusion model (case of corn) 
Time Country Diffusion R1t R2t 
1996 Argentina 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Brazil 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Canada 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 China 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Hungary 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 India 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Israel 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Korea 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Liechtenstein 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 New Zealand 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Norway 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Poland 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Romania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Russian Federation 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Slovakia 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Switzerland 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 Turkey 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1996 United States 0.01 0.00 0.00 
1996 EU(15) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1997 Argentina 0.02 0.85 5.00 
1997 Brazil 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1997 Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1997 Canada 0.30 0.00 5.00 
1997 China 0.00 0.18 5.00 
1997 Czech Republic 0.00 0.58 5.00 
1997 Hungary 0.00 0.50 5.00 
1997 India 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1997 Israel 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1997 Japan 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1997 Korea 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1997 Liechtenstein 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1997 Mexico 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1997 New Zealand 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1997 Norway 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1997 Poland 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1997 Romania 0.00 0.09 5.00 
1997 Russian Federation 0.00 0.02 5.00 
1997 Slovakia 0.00 0.02 5.00 
1997 South Africa 0.00 0.16 5.00 
1997 Switzerland 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1997 Turkey 0.00 0.00 5.00 
1997 United States 0.08 0.50 5.00 
1997 EU (15) 0.00 0.01 1.00 
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Table B.3 Continue 
 
Time Country Diffusion R1t R2t 
1998 Argentina 0.03 1.62 10.00 
1998 Brazil 0.00 0.00 10.00 
1998 Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 2.00 
1998 Canada 0.31 0.21 10.00 
1998 China 0.00 0.21 10.00 
1998 Czech Republic 0.00 0.59 0.00 
1998 Hungary 0.00 0.67 10.00 
1998 India 0.00 0.00 10.00 
1998 Israel 0.00 0.00 10.00 
1998 Japan 0.00 0.00 10.00 
1998 Korea 0.00 0.00 10.00 
1998 Liechtenstein 0.00 0.00 10.00 
1998 Mexico 0.01 0.02 10.00 
1998 New Zealand 0.00 0.03 10.00 
1998 Norway 0.00 0.00 10.00 
1998 Poland 0.00 0.00 10.00 
1998 Romania 0.00 0.06 10.00 
1998 Russian Federation 0.00 0.00 8.00 
1998 Slovakia 0.00 0.00 10.00 
1998 South Africa 0.01 0.16 10.00 
1998 Switzerland 0.00 0.00 2.00 
1998 Turkey 0.00 0.00 10.00 
1998 United States 0.35 1.13 10.00 
1998 EU(15) 0.00 0.01 2.00 
1999 Argentina 0.13 2.73 15.00 
1999 Brazil 0.00 0.00 15.00 
1999 Bulgaria 0.00 0.99 3.00 
1999 Canada 0.58 0.20 15.00 
1999 China 0.00 0.18 15.00 
1999 Czech Republic 0.00 1.90 0.00 
1999 Hungary 0.00 0.84 12.00 
1999 India 0.00 0.00 15.00 
1999 Israel 0.00 0.00 15.00 
1999 Japan 0.00 0.00 15.00 
1999 Korea 0.00 0.00 15.00 
1999 Liechtenstein 0.00 0.00 15.00 
1999 Mexico 0.01 0.01 15.00 
1999 New Zealand 0.00 0.03 15.00 
1999 Norway 0.00 0.00 6.00 
1999 Poland 0.00 0.00 15.00 
1999 Romania 0.00 0.10 15.00 
1999 Russian Federation 0.00 0.00 12.00 
1999 Slovakia 0.00 4.73 15.00 
1999 South Africa 0.05 0.01 15.00 
1999 Switzerland 0.00 0.00 3.00 
1999 Turkey 0.00 0.00 15.00 
1999 United States 0.45 1.72 15.00 
1999 EU(15) 0.00 0.02 3.00 
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Table B.3 Continue     
     
Time Country Diffusion R1t R2t 
2000 Argentina 0.09 1.59 20.00 
2000 Brazil 0.00 0.39 0.00 
2000 Bulgaria 0.02 0.42 4.00 
2000 Canada 0.46 0.17 20.00 
2000 China 0.00 0.95 16.00 
2000 Czech Republic 0.00 1.04 0.00 
2000 Hungary 0.00 0.53 16.00 
2000 India 0.00 0.00 20.00 
2000 Israel 0.00 0.00 4.00 
2000 Japan 0.00 0.00 12.00 
2000 Korea 0.00 0.00 16.00 
2000 Liechtenstein 0.00 0.00 20.00 
2000 Mexico 0.01 0.00 20.00 
2000 New Zealand 0.00 0.00 4.00 
2000 Norway 0.00 0.00 8.00 
2000 Poland 0.00 0.00 20.00 
2000 Romania 0.00 0.00 4.00 
2000 Russian Federation 0.00 0.00 16.00 
2000 Slovakia 0.00 2.76 20.00 
2000 South Africa 0.04 0.66 16.00 
2000 Switzerland 0.00 0.00 4.00 
2000 Turkey 0.00 0.01 20.00 
2000 United States 0.41 1.54 20.00 
2000 EU(15) 0.00 0.04 4.00 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table B.4 – Estimation of the diffusion parameters (case of corn) 
Dependent Variable: Diffusion 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample: 1996 2000 
Included observations: 5 
Number of cross-sections used: 21 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 105 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Local Tolerance *t 0.003 0.001 2.86 0.005 
Index of Foreign Tolerance *t 0.006 0.004 1.35 0.181 
Fixed Effects         
Argentina 0.03    
Australia -0.03    
Brazil -0.03    
Bulgaria -0.03    
Canada 0.30    
China -0.02    
Czech Republic -0.03    
EU (15) -0.03    
Hungary -0.03    
India -0.02    
Israel -0.02    
Korea -0.03    
Mexico -0.02    
New Zealand -0.03    
Poland -0.02    
Romania -0.03    
Russian Federation -0.02    
Slovakia -0.02    
South Africa 0.00    
Turkey -0.01    
United States 0.23       
R-squared 0.72     Mean dependent var 0.03 
Adjusted R-squared 0.65     S.D. dependent var 0.11 
S.E. of regression 0.06     Sum squared resid 0.32 
F-statistic 214.75     Durbin-Watson stat 1.10 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00       
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APPENDIX C – KEY MARKETS FOR MAJOR WHEAT EXPORTERS 
Table C.1 – Key markets for Argentina’s wheat (eleven-year average from 1990-2000, thousands of 
tonnes) 
Key Importing Countries Average  
Export 
Share from Total export Export over production 
Algeria 49 0.69% 0.39% 
Brazil 4,280 60.32% 33.94% 
China (including Taiwan) 82 1.16% 0.65% 
Egypt 151 2.12% 1.19% 
EU* 36 0.50% 0.28% 
India 20 0.28% 0.16% 
Indonesia 248 3.50% 1.97% 
Iran 227 3.19% 1.80% 
Japan 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Korea, South 24 0.33% 0.19% 
Malaysia 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Mexico 4 0.05% 0.03% 
Morocco 69 0.97% 0.55% 
Pakistan 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Philippines 0 0.00% 0.00% 
South Africa 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Tunisia 45 0.63% 0.36% 
Turkey 149 2.09% 1.18% 
USSR, former 23 0.32% 0.18% 
Venezuela 25 0.36% 0.20% 
Others 1,665 23.46% 13.20% 






Table C.2 – Key markets for Australia’s wheat (eleven-year average from 1990-2000, thousands of 
tonnes) 






Export over production 
Algeria 0 0 0.00% 
Brazil 0 0 0.00% 
China (including Taiwan) 754.11 5.86% 4.21% 
Egypt 1178.35 9.15% 6.57% 
EU* 126.94 0.99% 0.71% 
India 444.5 3.45% 2.48% 
Indonesia 1467.74 11.40% 8.19% 
Iran 1545.62 12.00% 8.62% 
Japan 1137.57 8.84% 6.35% 
Korea, South 925.64 7.19% 5.16% 
Malaysia 664.0 5.16% 3.70% 
Mexico 0 0 0.00% 
Morocco 20.6 0.16% 0.11% 
Pakistan 579.5 4.50% 3.23% 
Philippines 119.6 0.93% 0.67% 
South Africa 0 0 0.00% 
Tunisia 6.9 0.05% 0.04% 
Turkey 0 0 0.00% 
USSR, former 223.33 1.73% 1.25% 
Venezuela 0 0.0% 0.00% 
Others 3680.37 28.59% 20.54% 









Table C.3 – Key markets for Canada’s wheat (eleven-year average from 1990-2000, thousands of 
tonnes) 




Algeria 55 0.35% 0.20% 
Brazil 868.9 5.63% 3.23% 
China, Peoples' Rep. 2642.63 17.13% 9.84% 
Egypt 45.845 0.30% 0.17% 
EU* 719.075 4.29% 2.68% 
India 78.93 0.51% 0.29% 
Indonesia 848.7 5.50% 3.16% 
Iran 1635.7 10.60% 6.09% 
Japan 1346 8.72% 5.01% 
Korea, South 854.85 5.54% 3.18% 
Malaysia 210.84 1.37% 0.78% 
Mexico 686.91 4.45% 2.56% 
Morocco 64 0.42% 0.24% 
Nigeria 83.01 0.54% 0.31% 
Pakistan 150.74 0.98% 0.56% 
Philippines 293.05 1.90% 1.09% 
South Africa 148.185 0.96% 0.55% 
Tunisia 8.05 0.05% 0.03% 
Turkey 46.68 0.30% 0.17% 
United States 1206.64 7.82% 4.49% 
USSR, Former 564.83 3.66% 2.10% 
Venezuela 313.46 2.03% 1.17% 
Others 2,555 16.56% 9.51% 









Table C.4 – Key markets for EU’s wheat (eleven-year average from 1990-2000, thousands of tonnes) 




Algeria 1541.17 9.32% 1.64% 
Brazil 117.71 0.71% 0.13% 
China (including Taiwan) 681.36 4.12% 0.72% 
Egypt 872.35 5.28% 0.93% 
India 0 0 0.00% 
Indonesia 110.41 0.67% 0.12% 
Iran 347.83 2.10% 0.37% 
Japan 0 0 0.00% 
Korea, South 166.78 1.01% 0.18% 
Malaysia 0 0 0.00% 
Mexico 13.9 0.08% 0.01% 
Morocco 1069.04 6.47% 1.14% 
Pakistan 69 0.42% 0.07% 
Philippines 0 0 0.00% 
South Africa 0 0 0.00% 
Tunisia 422.12 2.55% 0.45% 
Turkey 240.7 1.46% 0.26% 
USSR (former) 2485.16 15.03% 2.64% 
Venezuela 50.22 0.30% 0.05% 
Others 8344.23 50.47% 8.87% 











Table C.5 – Key markets for the USA’s wheat (eleven-year average from 1990-2000, thousands of 
tonnes) 






Algeria 781 2.50% 1.24% 
Brazil 232.88 0.74% 0.37% 
China (including Taiwan) 2964.83 9.48% 4.70% 
Egypt 4,025 12.88% 6.38% 
EU* 873.71 2.80% 1.38% 
India 120 0.4% 0.19% 
Indonesia 212 0.7% 0.34% 
Iran 0 0 0.00% 
Japan 3180.6 10.17% 5.04% 
Korea, South 1,563 5.00% 2.48% 
Malaysia 0 0 0.00% 
Mexico 1056.65 3.38% 1.67% 
Morocco 638 2.04% 1.01% 
Pakistan 1,420 4.5% 2.25% 
Philippines 1682.12 5.38% 2.67% 
South Africa 255 0.81% 0.40% 
Tunisia 280 0.90% 0.44% 
Turkey 171.33 0.55% 0.27% 
USSR (former) 2206.01 7.06% 3.50% 
Venezuela 571 1.83% 0.90% 
Others 9025.62 28.87% 14.30% 





APPENDIX D – DIFFUSION MODEL RESULTS 
Table D.1 – Global adoption of GM wheat under different scenarios 
 SC2.a SC2.c SC2.d SC1.b SC1.d SC1.a SC1.c 
2005 3% 3% 3% 0% 3% 0% 0% 
2006 4% 4% 4% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
2007 6% 6% 5% 0% 5% 0% 0% 
2008 7% 7% 7% 0% 6% 0% 0% 
2009 8% 8% 8% 0% 7% 0% 0% 
2010 9% 9% 9% 1% 8% 0% 0% 
2011 10% 10% 10% 1% 9% 0% 0% 
2012 12% 12% 11% 1% 10% 0% 0% 
2013 13% 13% 12% 1% 10% 0% 0% 
2014 14% 14% 13% 1% 11% 0% 0% 
2015 15% 15% 14% 2% 12% 0% 0% 
2016 15% 15% 15% 2% 13% 0% 0% 
2017 16% 16% 16% 2% 13% 0% 0% 
2018 17% 17% 17% 2% 14% 0% 0% 
2019 18% 18% 17% 2% 15% 0% 0% 
2020 19% 19% 18% 2% 15% 0% 0% 
2021 20% 20% 19% 3% 16% 0% 0% 
2022 20% 20% 20% 3% 17% 0% 0% 
2023 21% 21% 20% 3% 17% 0% 0% 
2024 22% 22% 21% 3% 18% 0% 0% 
2025 22% 22% 22% 3% 18% 0% 0% 
2026 23% 23% 22% 3% 19% 0% 0% 
2027 24% 24% 23% 4% 19% 0% 0% 
2028 24% 24% 23% 4% 20% 0% 0% 
2029 25% 25% 24% 4% 20% 0% 0% 
2030 25% 25% 25% 4% 21% 0% 0% 
Source: Results from the diffusion model 
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Table D.2 – GM wheat adoption rates in Argentina from 2000 to 2030 under different scenarios 
 SC2.a or 
Sc2.c 
SC2.d SC1.d SC1.a or 
SC1.c 
SC1.b 
2005 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2006 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 
2007 6% 6% 6% 0% 0% 
2008 11% 11% 11% 0% 0% 
2009 15% 15% 15% 0% 0% 
2010 20% 20% 19% 0% 0% 
2011 24% 24% 23% 0% 0% 
2012 28% 28% 27% 0% 0% 
2013 31% 31% 31% 0% 0% 
2014 35% 35% 34% 0% 0% 
2015 38% 38% 37% 0% 0% 
2016 41% 41% 40% 0% 0% 
2017 44% 44% 43% 0% 0% 
2018 47% 47% 46% 0% 0% 
2019 50% 49% 49% 0% 0% 
2020 52% 52% 51% 0% 0% 
2021 54% 54% 54% 0% 0% 
2022 57% 57% 56% 0% 0% 
2023 59% 59% 58% 0% 0% 
2024 61% 61% 60% 0% 0% 
2025 63% 63% 62% 0% 0% 
2026 65% 65% 64% 0% 0% 
2027 67% 67% 66% 0% 0% 
2028 68% 68% 67% 0% 0% 
2029 70% 70% 69% 0% 0% 
2030 71% 71% 71% 0% 0% 
Source: Results from the diffusion model 
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Table D.3 – GM wheat adoption rates in Australia from 2000 to 2030 under different scenarios 
 SC2.a or 
Sc2.c 
SC2.d SC1.d SC1.a or 
SC1.c 
SC1.b 
2005 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2006 3% 2% 2% 0% 0% 
2007 8% 7% 7% 0% 0% 
2008 14% 12% 12% 0% 0% 
2009 19% 17% 16% 0% 0% 
2010 24% 21% 21% 0% 0% 
2011 28% 25% 25% 0% 0% 
2012 33% 29% 29% 0% 0% 
2013 37% 33% 33% 0% 0% 
2014 41% 36% 36% 0% 0% 
2015 44% 40% 39% 0% 0% 
2016 47% 43% 43% 0% 0% 
2017 51% 46% 46% 0% 0% 
2018 54% 49% 48% 0% 0% 
2019 56% 51% 51% 0% 0% 
2020 59% 54% 54% 0% 0% 
2021 61% 56% 56% 0% 0% 
2022 64% 59% 58% 0% 0% 
2023 66% 61% 61% 0% 0% 
2024 68% 63% 63% 0% 0% 
2025 70% 65% 65% 0% 0% 
2026 72% 67% 66% 0% 0% 
2027 73% 69% 68% 0% 0% 
2028 75% 70% 70% 0% 0% 
2029 76% 72% 71% 0% 0% 
2030 78% 73% 73% 0% 0% 
Source: Results from the diffusion model 
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Table D.4 – GM wheat adoption rates in Canada from 2000 to 2030 under different scenarios  
 SC2.a or 
Sc2.c 
SC2.d SC1.d SC1.a or 
SC1.c 
SC1.b 
2005 26% 26% 26% 0% 0% 
2006 29% 29% 29% 0% 0% 
2007 32% 32% 31% 0% 0% 
2008 35% 34% 34% 0% 0% 
2009 38% 37% 37% 0% 0% 
2010 41% 40% 39% 0% 0% 
2011 44% 42% 41% 0% 0% 
2012 46% 44% 43% 0% 0% 
2013 49% 46% 46% 0% 0% 
2014 51% 49% 48% 0% 0% 
2015 53% 51% 50% 0% 0% 
2016 55% 53% 52% 0% 0% 
2017 57% 55% 53% 0% 0% 
2018 59% 56% 55% 0% 0% 
2019 61% 58% 57% 0% 0% 
2020 63% 60% 58% 0% 0% 
2021 64% 61% 60% 0% 0% 
2022 66% 63% 62% 0% 0% 
2023 68% 64% 63% 0% 0% 
2024 69% 66% 64% 0% 0% 
2025 70% 67% 66% 0% 0% 
2026 72% 68% 67% 0% 0% 
2027 73% 70% 68% 0% 0% 
2028 74% 71% 69% 0% 0% 
2029 75% 72% 71% 0% 0% 
2030 77% 73% 72% 0% 0% 
Source: Results from the diffusion model 
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Table D.5 – GM wheat adoption rates in China from 2000 to 2030 under different scenarios 
 SC2.a or 
Sc2.c 
SC2.d SC1.d SC1.a or 
SC1.c 
SC1.b 
2005 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2006 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2007 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
2008 2% 2% 2% 0% 2% 
2009 4% 4% 4% 0% 4% 
2010 5% 5% 5% 0% 5% 
2011 6% 6% 6% 0% 6% 
2012 8% 8% 8% 0% 8% 
2013 9% 9% 9% 0% 9% 
2014 11% 11% 11% 0% 11% 
2015 12% 12% 12% 0% 12% 
2016 13% 13% 13% 0% 13% 
2017 14% 14% 14% 0% 14% 
2018 16% 16% 16% 0% 16% 
2019 17% 17% 17% 0% 17% 
2020 18% 18% 18% 0% 18% 
2021 19% 19% 19% 0% 19% 
2022 21% 21% 21% 0% 21% 
2023 22% 22% 22% 0% 22% 
2024 23% 23% 23% 0% 23% 
2025 24% 24% 24% 0% 24% 
2026 25% 25% 25% 0% 25% 
2027 26% 26% 26% 0% 26% 
2028 27% 27% 27% 0% 27% 
2029 29% 29% 29% 0% 29% 
2030 30% 30% 30% 0% 30% 
Source: Results from the diffusion model 
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Table D.6 – GM wheat adoption rates in the EU from 2000 to 2030 under different scenarios 
 SC2.a or 
Sc2.c 
SC2.d SC1.d SC1.a or 
SC1.c 
SC1.b 
2005 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2006 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 
2007 5% 5% 0% 0% 0% 
2008 7% 7% 0% 0% 0% 
2009 9% 9% 0% 0% 0% 
2010 12% 12% 0% 0% 0% 
2011 14% 14% 0% 0% 0% 
2012 16% 16% 0% 0% 0% 
2013 19% 19% 0% 0% 0% 
2014 21% 21% 0% 0% 0% 
2015 23% 23% 0% 0% 0% 
2016 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 
2017 27% 27% 0% 0% 0% 
2018 29% 29% 0% 0% 0% 
2019 31% 31% 0% 0% 0% 
2020 32% 32% 0% 0% 0% 
2021 34% 34% 0% 0% 0% 
2022 36% 36% 0% 0% 0% 
2023 37% 37% 0% 0% 0% 
2024 39% 39% 0% 0% 0% 
2025 41% 41% 0% 0% 0% 
2026 42% 42% 0% 0% 0% 
2027 44% 44% 0% 0% 0% 
2028 45% 45% 0% 0% 0% 
2029 47% 47% 0% 0% 0% 
2030 48% 48% 0% 0% 0% 
Source: Results from the diffusion model 
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Table D.7 – GM wheat adoption rates in the USA from 2000 to 2030 under different scenarios 
 SC2.a or 
Sc2.c 
SC2.d SC1.d SC1.a or 
SC1.c 
SC1.b 
2005 19% 19% 19% 0% 0% 
2006 23% 22% 22% 0% 0% 
2007 26% 26% 25% 0% 0% 
2008 30% 29% 28% 0% 0% 
2009 33% 32% 31% 0% 0% 
2010 36% 34% 34% 0% 0% 
2011 39% 37% 36% 0% 0% 
2012 42% 40% 39% 0% 0% 
2013 44% 42% 41% 0% 0% 
2014 47% 45% 43% 0% 0% 
2015 49% 47% 46% 0% 0% 
2016 52% 49% 48% 0% 0% 
2017 54% 51% 50% 0% 0% 
2018 56% 53% 52% 0% 0% 
2019 58% 55% 54% 0% 0% 
2020 60% 57% 55% 0% 0% 
2021 62% 59% 57% 0% 0% 
2022 64% 61% 59% 0% 0% 
2023 65% 62% 60% 0% 0% 
2024 67% 64% 62% 0% 0% 
2025 68% 65% 63% 0% 0% 
2026 70% 67% 65% 0% 0% 
2027 71% 68% 66% 0% 0% 
2028 73% 69% 67% 0% 0% 
2029 74% 71% 69% 0% 0% 
2030 75% 72% 70% 0% 0% 
Source: Results from the diffusion model 
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APPENDIX E – FOOD SECURITY MODEL RESULTS 
Table E.1 – Real world wheat prices under different opposition scenarios 
 SC2.a SC2.c SC2.d SC1.b SC1.d SC1.a SC1.c 
2000 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 
2001 152 149 152 152 152 152 149 
2002 155 150 155 155 155 155 150 
2003 147 145 147 147 147 147 145 
2004 150 146 150 150 150 150 146 
2005 148 143 148 148 148 148 143 
2006 148 142 148 148 148 148 142 
2007 138 136 138 139 138 139 136 
2008 130 129 130 132 130 132 131 
2009 135 131 135 137 135 138 133 
2010 131 127 131 134 131 134 131 
2011 123 121 123 127 124 128 126 
2012 120 118 120 125 121 126 124 
2013 120 117 121 127 122 128 124 
2014 122 117 122 129 121 130 125 
2015 113 110 113 120 114 121 119 
2016 107 106 108 115 109 116 115 
2017 109 106 109 117 110 118 115 
2018 110 105 110 119 112 120 115 
2019 106 102 106 115 108 116 112 
2020 106 101 106 115 108 116 112 
2021 104 99 105 114 106 115 110 
2022 94 92 94 103 96 105 103 
2023 92 90 92 101 94 103 101 
2024 99 93 100 110 102 111 105 
2025 90 87 91 101 92 102 99 
2026 86 83 86 96 88 98 95 
2027 89 85 90 100 91 102 97 
2028 87 83 87 98 89 100 96 
2029 79 77 79 90 81 92 90 
2030 82 78 82 93 84 95 91 








Table E.2 – Availability of wheat (million tonnes) under different opposition scenarios 
 SC2.a SC2.c SC2.d SC1.b SC1.d SC1.a SC1.c 
2000 707.02 707.02 707.02 707.02 707.02 707.02 707.02 
2001 699.54 703.00 699.54 699.54 699.54 699.54 699.54 
2002 697.06 702.24 697.06 697.06 697.06 697.06 697.06 
2003 704.46 707.43 704.46 704.46 704.46 704.46 704.46 
2004 701.79 706.46 701.79 701.79 701.79 701.79 701.79 
2005 704.40 709.61 704.40 704.40 704.40 704.40 704.40 
2006 703.74 710.27 703.73 703.40 703.71 703.40 703.40 
2007 713.96 716.93 713.94 713.08 713.87 713.07 713.08 
2008 722.46 723.40 722.40 720.88 722.25 720.81 720.88 
2009 717.43 721.71 717.33 714.97 717.06 714.82 714.97 
2010 721.96 725.66 721.80 718.51 721.39 718.25 718.51 
2011 730.18 732.21 729.97 725.69 729.39 725.29 725.69 
2012 733.40 735.38 733.13 727.75 732.37 727.19 727.75 
2013 732.91 736.25 732.59 725.99 731.61 725.23 725.99 
2014 731.21 736.74 730.85 723.67 726.86 722.78 723.67 
2015 740.70 743.58 740.33 732.82 739.43 731.83 732.82 
2016 746.30 747.91 745.92 738.08 744.69 737.00 738.08 
2017 745.05 748.35 744.66 736.42 743.31 735.23 736.42 
2018 743.79 748.86 743.38 734.74 741.94 733.45 734.74 
2019 747.76 751.78 747.35 738.37 745.83 736.98 738.37 
2020 748.10 753.23 747.68 738.39 746.09 736.89 738.39 
2021 749.81 754.97 749.39 739.76 747.72 738.17 739.76 
2022 760.61 762.51 760.19 750.49 758.48 748.84 750.49 
2023 762.90 765.06 762.48 752.60 760.73 750.87 752.60 
2024 754.82 760.99 754.39 744.04 752.54 742.18 744.04 
2025 764.46 767.85 764.04 753.62 762.16 751.71 753.62 
2026 769.17 771.79 768.76 758.25 766.84 756.28 758.25 
2027 765.50 770.23 765.09 754.24 763.10 752.17 754.24 
2028 767.70 772.14 767.29 756.23 765.24 754.07 756.23 
2029 776.25 778.53 775.86 764.85 773.81 762.65 764.85 
2030 773.31 777.36 772.92 761.64 770.80 759.35 761.64 







Table E.3 – Consumption of wheat (million tonnes) under different opposition scenarios 
 SC2.a SC2.c SC2.d SC1.b SC1.d SC1.a SC1.c 
2000 593.41 593.41 593.41 593.41 593.41 593.41 593.41 
2001 589.03 591.05 589.03 589.03 589.03 589.03 591.05 
2002 587.57 590.60 587.57 587.57 587.57 587.57 590.60 
2003 591.91 593.65 591.91 591.91 591.91 591.91 593.65 
2004 590.34 593.08 590.34 590.34 590.34 590.34 593.08 
2005 591.87 594.93 591.87 591.87 591.87 591.87 594.93 
2006 591.48 595.31 591.48 591.29 591.47 591.29 595.11 
2007 597.48 599.22 597.46 596.96 597.42 596.95 598.70 
2008 602.46 603.01 602.43 601.53 602.34 601.50 602.04 
2009 599.51 602.02 599.45 598.07 599.29 597.98 600.49 
2010 602.17 604.34 602.08 600.14 601.83 599.99 602.17 
2011 606.98 608.18 606.86 604.35 606.52 604.12 605.31 
2012 608.87 610.03 608.72 605.56 608.27 605.23 606.40 
2013 608.59 610.55 608.40 604.53 607.83 604.09 606.06 
2014 607.59 610.83 607.38 603.17 608.19 602.65 605.92 
2015 613.15 614.84 612.94 608.53 612.41 607.95 609.66 
2016 616.43 617.38 616.21 611.62 615.49 610.98 611.93 
2017 615.70 617.64 615.47 610.64 614.68 609.94 611.89 
2018 614.96 617.94 614.73 609.66 613.88 608.90 611.90 
2019 617.29 619.65 617.05 611.79 616.16 610.97 613.36 
2020 617.49 620.50 617.25 611.80 616.31 610.92 613.97 
2021 618.50 621.52 618.25 612.60 617.27 611.67 614.75 
2022 624.82 625.94 624.58 618.90 623.58 617.93 619.06 
2023 626.17 627.44 625.92 620.13 624.90 619.12 620.39 
2024 621.43 625.05 621.18 615.11 620.09 614.02 617.71 
2025 627.08 629.07 626.84 620.73 625.73 619.61 621.64 
2026 629.84 631.38 629.60 623.44 628.48 622.29 623.84 
2027 627.70 630.47 627.45 621.09 626.29 619.88 622.71 
2028 628.98 631.59 628.74 622.26 627.54 620.99 623.67 
2029 634.00 635.33 633.76 627.31 632.56 626.02 627.38 
2030 632.27 634.65 632.04 625.43 630.80 624.09 626.52 





Table E.4 – End stock of wheat (million tonnes) under different opposition scenarios 
 SC2.a SC2.c SC2.d SC1.b SC1.d SC1.a SC1.c 
2000 113.61 113.61 113.61 113.61 113.61 113.61 113.61 
2001 110.52 111.95 110.52 110.52 110.52 110.52 108.49 
2002 109.49 111.63 109.49 109.49 109.49 109.49 106.45 
2003 112.55 113.78 112.55 112.55 112.55 112.55 110.81 
2004 111.45 113.38 111.45 111.45 111.45 111.45 108.71 
2005 112.53 114.68 112.53 112.53 112.53 112.53 109.47 
2006 112.25 114.95 112.25 112.11 112.24 112.11 108.28 
2007 116.48 117.71 116.47 116.12 116.45 116.11 114.38 
2008 120 120.39 119.97 119.34 119.91 119.32 118.83 
2009 117.92 119.69 117.88 116.9 117.77 116.84 114.48 
2010 119.79 121.32 119.73 118.36 119.56 118.26 116.34 
2011 123.19 124.03 123.11 121.33 122.87 121.17 120.38 
2012 124.52 125.34 124.41 122.19 124.1 121.96 121.36 
2013 124.32 125.71 124.19 121.46 123.79 121.15 119.93 
2014 123.62 125.91 123.47 120.5 118.67 120.13 117.75 
2015 127.55 128.74 127.39 124.28 127.02 123.88 123.16 
2016 129.86 130.53 129.7 126.46 129.2 126.01 126.15 
2017 129.35 130.71 129.18 125.77 128.63 125.28 124.53 
2018 128.82 130.92 128.66 125.08 128.06 124.54 122.84 
2019 130.47 132.13 130.3 126.58 129.67 126.01 125.01 
2020 130.61 132.73 130.44 126.59 129.78 125.97 124.41 
2021 131.32 133.45 131.14 127.16 130.45 126.5 125.01 
2022 135.78 136.57 135.61 131.6 134.9 130.91 131.44 
2023 136.73 137.63 136.56 132.47 135.83 131.75 132.21 
2024 133.39 135.94 133.21 128.93 132.44 128.16 126.32 
2025 137.38 138.78 137.2 132.89 136.42 132.1 131.98 
2026 139.33 140.41 139.16 134.81 138.36 133.99 134.41 
2027 137.81 139.77 137.64 133.15 136.81 132.29 131.53 
2028 138.72 140.55 138.55 133.97 137.7 133.08 132.56 
2029 142.26 143.2 142.09 137.54 141.24 136.63 137.47 
2030 141.04 142.71 140.88 136.21 140 135.26 135.12 





Table E.5 – Probability of high prices 
 Sc1.a Sc1.b Sc1.c Sc1.d Sc2.a Sc2.c Sc2.d 
2000-2005 14% 14% 15% 14% 14% 15% 14% 
2005-2010 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 
2010-2015 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 20% 19% 
2015-2020 14% 14% 15% 15% 15% 15% 14% 
2020-2025 19% 18% 19% 19% 18% 19% 18% 
2025-230 14% 14% 15% 14% 14% 15% 14% 
Source: Author’s calculation form simulation results 
 
Table E.6 – Price variability between 2000 and 2030 
 Sc1.a Sc1.b Sc1.c Sc1.d Sc2.a Sc2.c Sc2.d 
2000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2001 30% 30% 19% 30% 30% 19% 30% 
2002 30% 30% 19% 30% 30% 19% 30% 
2003 27% 27% 17% 27% 27% 17% 27% 
2004 26% 26% 16% 26% 26% 16% 26% 
2005 33% 33% 20% 33% 33% 20% 33% 
2006 33% 33% 21% 33% 33% 21% 33% 
2007 25% 25% 16% 25% 25% 16% 25% 
2008 26% 26% 17% 26% 26% 17% 26% 
2009 30% 30% 19% 30% 30% 19% 30% 
2010 29% 29% 18% 29% 30% 18% 30% 
2011 30% 30% 20% 31% 31% 20% 31% 
2012 29% 29% 18% 30% 30% 19% 30% 
2013 26% 27% 17% 27% 28% 18% 28% 
2014 33% 33% 21% 35% 34% 22% 34% 
2015 31% 32% 20% 33% 33% 21% 33% 
2016 31% 31% 19% 33% 33% 20% 33% 
2017 35% 35% 21% 36% 37% 23% 37% 
2018 38% 39% 23% 40% 41% 25% 41% 
2019 32% 32% 19% 33% 34% 21% 34% 
2020 36% 36% 23% 38% 39% 25% 39% 
2021 33% 33% 21% 35% 36% 23% 35% 
2022 32% 32% 21% 34% 35% 22% 34% 
2023 37% 37% 23% 40% 40% 25% 40% 
2024 36% 36% 23% 39% 39% 25% 39% 
2025 37% 38% 24% 40% 41% 26% 41% 
2026 40% 41% 26% 44% 45% 28% 45% 
2027 39% 39% 24% 42% 43% 27% 42% 
2028 34% 35% 22% 37% 38% 24% 38% 
2029 40% 40% 25% 44% 45% 28% 44% 
2030 36% 37% 23% 40% 41% 26% 41% 
Source: Author’s calculation form simulation results 
